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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1990's in Western culture a range of animal issues have 
become important. Some old ones have taken on a new urgency and 
some new questions have emerged. The key philosophical question in 
relation to non-human animals has been how are they distinct from 
humans. The criteria of sentience, reason, tool-making, language, free 
will and  culture have all had their philosophical supporters. Yet the 
recent studies of  free ranging apes and monkeys challenge all these 
criteria.  The research on captive bonobos2 dolphins3 and parrots4 has 
also raised questions about the uniqueness of language as a human trait. 
This has led some to argue that there is a need to re-define species 
boundaries or at least to re-think what it is that makes us human as 
distinct from animal. While others take the view that even embarking on 
the latter project is pointless and borne from human arrogance. Whatever 
one's position, the certainties in this area are gone. 
 
The ethical questions stride into view with the  growing awareness of the 
horrors of the expanding factory farm and as more young people turn to 
vegetarianism there is a need to clarify the moral basis beyond just an 
intuitive revulsion. The presentation of cannibalism as a theme in some 
recent films,5 and as a reality in some on-going wars also deserves 
comment.  
 
Animal experimentation has been a source of concern for some time. The 
setting up of ethics committees in the last two decades may to some 
extent have dulled dissent. Yet this way of handling the ethical issues of 
experimentation does have its critics.6 Also there has been very little 
discussion of new techniques such as xenotransplantation and cloning. 
Xenotransplantation is the transplantation of organs or tissues between 
species, a procedure which is already in use and it is likely to expand 
given the promise of greater success with advances in breeding programs 
including the genetic engineering of animals, and immunology. The 
successful cloning of sheep and monkeys is said to point to an early date 
for the successful cloning of humans. There are some crying out for the 
discussion of ethical issues concerning human cloning but surely we 
need to consider these in relation to non-human animals too.  
 
Vertebrate animals are usually the sole focus of ethicical discussions of 
concerning animals in experimentation. Yet some Australian researchers, 
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working on coral in the Great Barrier Reef have suggested that 
invertebrate animals should also be considered.7  
 
All of these ethical issues (and others such as zoos, pets and circuses) 
raise not only specific questions about the food industry, about eating, 
experimenting, teaching and recreation, but also the general question: 
what is the basis, if any, for the moral consideration of animals and how 
far does it extend? A range of new books have been published is this 
area and it will no doubt become a central philosophical concern in the 
future.  
 
Another philosophical/ethical issue which has risen into prominence in 
the 1990's is the link between speciesism and sexism, a theme taken up 
by some of the writers in this issue, clearly negating the earlier feminist 
fear that expressing concern for animals might work to strengthen a 
woman/animal link and further denigrate women.  Another issue is the 
connection or conflict between animal advocates and environmentalists 
or ecologists, an area which needs a great deal more work.  
 
Submissions are invited on all of these areas, in fact any area of 
philosophical or ethical concern related to animals. 
 
Notes 
1.  See for instance, Jane Goodall, In the Shadow of Man, Revised 
Edition (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1988); Dian Fossey, Gorillas in the 
Mist  (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1983) and Birute Galdikas, Reflections 
of Eden  (Victor Gollancz, London, 1995) and Donald R. Griffin, Animal 
Minds  (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992).  
2.  Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and Roger Lewin, Kanzi: The Ape at the 
Brink of the Human Mind  (Doubleday, London, 1994). 
3. Louis Herman, 'Receptive Competencies in Language-Trained 
Animals' in J. Rosenblatt, et al, eds. Advances in the study of behavior 
(Academic Press, New York, 1987), pp.16-38. 
4. I.M. Pepperberg, 'Referential Mapping: A Technique for Attaching 
Functional Significance to the Innovative Utterances of an African Gray 
Parrot (Psittacus erithacus)', Applied Psycholinguistics, 11, (1990), 
pp.23-44.  
5.   For example, 'The Cook, the Thief, His Wife, Her Lover'. 
6.  See for instance, Denise Russell 'The Ethics of Animal Ethics 
Committees', Proceedings of the Animals in Science Conference, 
Monash University, 1995. 
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7.    Paul Marshall, 'Ethics for invertebrates'. ANZCCART News, 9, 1996, 
p.6.
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LIVING WITH ANIMALS  
 
Freya Mathews 
 
'Without animals,' says Peter, a Maasai nomad interviewed in the New 
Internationalist1, 'life isn't worth living'.  
 
Sitting here in my inner-city backyard writing this, with a circle of 
attentive little upturned canine and feline faces surrounding me, and my 
cranky duck tugging at my shoelaces, I could not be in more heartfelt 
agreement. But how many people today would share this sentiment? For 
how many would it be football that makes life worth living, or cars, or 
opera, or ice-skating? Is there anything to ground the conviction that I 
want to defend here, that the company of non-human animals is a 
necessary part of human life, in a way that football, cars, opera and ice-
skating manifestly are not, and that we relinquish or forego it at our 
peril?  
 
There are two parts to this question. The first is, is it important for us, for 
our own well-being or the realization of our human potential, that we 
live in intimate commensal relations with animals? The second is, is it 
important for the environment that we live in such relations? Does the 
world need us to continue to live in our ancestral communalism with 
animals?  
 
My view is that our present estrangement, as human beings, from both 
the natural world (as evidenced in the environmental crisis) and from 
ourselves (as evidenced in the intense neuroticization of life in 
contemporary 'advanced' societies) is due at least in part to the 
progressive removal of animals from our day-to-day urban reality; 
consequently I shall argue that, in order to address both the 
environmental crisis and our own crisis of consciousness, we need to 
find ways of restoring animals to the human household. 
  
I cannot hope here to exhaust the discussion invited by this question, or 
even to do justice to its larger significance. I shall merely offer several 
relatively straightforward arguments in favour of human-animal 
commensality, and then offer a very personal reflection on the deeper 
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cosmological significance of these relations, as this has unfolded for me 
through my own experience.  
 
 
    
Our Need for Animal Company 
 
Firstly then, are intimate connections with animals foundational to our 
human well-being? It is by now a well-established research finding that 
people who enjoy the day-to-day friendship of animals, or who are, 
according to contemporary parlance, 'pet owners'2, are healthier in 
various respects than people who do not: they tend to visit the doctor less 
frequently, use less medication, have lower cholesterol and blood 
pressure levels, recover more quickly from illness and suffer less from 
feelings of loneliness.3 Indeed, it has been estimated that 'pet ownership' 
saves the Australian health care system one and a half billion dollars per 
year.4  
 
Why might this be so? One reason may be that companionate 
relationships with animals defuse a lot of the socially generated pressure 
in our lives. Animals are non-judgmental friends. They do not compete 
with us. Hence we can relax with them, and enjoy spontaneous affection 
and cathartic physical closeness: we can 'be ourselves' in the presence of 
such companions, since they have no socially acquired expectations of 
us. They offer us emotional and psychological release.  
 
Friendships with animals may be stress-reducing in a further way. 
Emotional involvement with creatures who do not share our human goals 
and aspirations, our system of values, enables us to gain an external 
perspective on those values. It enables us to imagine how odd or 
arbitrary our human priorities might appear from a non-human 
perspective. When revealed in this light, socially-prescribed imperatives 
have less hold on us - we can achieve a certain distance from them, a 
certain detachment. We become less driven, less enslaved to abstract 
ideals and images, and hence more receptive to our actual bodily and 
instinctual needs, more self-accepting, with all the implications for 
health and healing that flow from this.  
 
It does not seem too far-fetched, to me, to speculate that there may even 
be a direct physiological dependence of humans on animal 
companionship that would help to explain why people who enjoy that 
 6 
companionship are healthier than others. Some evolutionary theorists are 
currently arguing that our ancestors' early genetic 'contract' with certain 
animals - particularly dogs - enabled us to develop the characteristics 
that now mark us as human. According to this theory5, it was our 
association with dogs - which was initiated at least in part by the dogs 
themselves, possibly as early as one hundred thousand years ago6 - 
which enabled our ancestors to dispense with something that is otherwise 
mandatory for mammalian predators, namely an acute sense of smell: 
when dogs agreed to join us in the hunt, they could henceforth do our 
sniffing for us. The advantage for us of delegating our scenting function 
in this way was that we could thereby dispense with our muzzle.  Sans 
muzzle, we could achieve frontal vision, and hence improved hand-eye 
co-ordination, where this in turn was a precondition for the development 
of our tool-making capability. The retraction of the muzzle also entailed 
the shrinkage and refinement of the tongue, which thereby became 
capable of the short, highly differentiated sounds required for speech.  
According to this theory then, it was through a functional inter-
dependence with dogs that we became human. (This theory adds an 
amazingly literal dimension to the Aboriginal myth of human origins 
recounted so beautifully by Deborah Bird Rose in her book, Dingo 
Makes Us Human.7) The deal for dogs, in this scenario, was of course 
that they received board and lodgings; history has resoundingly 
vindicated the proto-dogs' evolutionary choice.  
 
If this evolutionary story is accepted - and the fact that nearly all known 
human communities have included dogs helps to bear it out - then it is 
possible that human beings have a physiological need for contact with 
dogs. Our bodies may unconsciously respond to certain subtle canine 
emanations, just as women's bodies, for instance, unconsciously respond 
to the subtle menstrual signals emanating from their female house mates. 
If our compact with dogs indeed rested on certain evolutionary 
imperatives, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that that compact may 
be reinforced by other more direct, physiological forms of inter-
dependency. If all dogs were banished from our cities - and many 
indignant citizens are calling for just such a ban - a massive malaise in 
the human population might ensue. Such a malaise might take directly 
physical form, such as immunological decline; recent evidence that 
raising children without exposure to ('dirty') animals tends to weaken 
their immune systems, where this renders them susceptible to allergies, 
counts in favour of this kind of interpretation.  But the malaise might 
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also take a more psychological form - it might be more akin to the 
depression which is already present in epidemic proportions in our 
relatively animal-free 'advanced' industrial civilizations. It might 
manifest as a vague sense of incompleteness or meaninglessness, leading 
to emotional neediness and compensating material acquisitiveness. Or it 
might be experienced as an existential loneliness which no amount of 
intra-species socialising can assuage.  
 
Consider the latter possibility for a moment. If we have lived in intimate 
community with dogs, for instance, for anything up to a hundred 
thousand years, wouldn't it be likely that we would have a distinct 
psychological need for their company, a need that could not be satisfied 
by human substitutes? Anyone who habitually walks in open spaces with 
a close canine friend can testify to the unique appropriateness of dogs as 
walking companions. Bounding along with infectious interest and joy in 
their surroundings, they leave us free - free to think our own thoughts 
and to observe those surroundings keenly ourselves - while nevertheless 
staying faithfully within our orbit, maintaining an unobtrusive closeness 
with us. Alternatively, anyone who has spent time in Aboriginal 
settlements can testify to the feeling of comfort that a dog clan can lend 
to a community, provided of course that the dogs are not themselves a 
source of danger. Their constant mingling with the people, their presence 
at meetings and their forays onto the football field, their barking and 
carrying on amongst themselves on the margins of human activities, add 
a safe, convivial and companionable dimension to life, a dimension that 
has been entirely lost in the larger cities. Nor is it only dogs which 
provide a distinctive quality of companionship. To sit in the garden with 
an affectionate duck can afford a uniquely peaceful interlude in the daily 
round. To travel with horses or camels can give a far richer sense of 
journeying than can either solitary travel or travel with exclusively 
human company.  
 
In light of the emotional and psychological satisfactions that we have 
experienced for thousands of years in the wider social world of the 
'mixed community'8 of humans and animals then, isn't it reasonable to 
assume that, deprived of these satisfactions, we moderns might feel 
unfulfilled and obscurely lonely, even if we have never experienced 
these satisfactions at first hand, for ourselves. And mightn't this 
unfulfilment and loneliness contribute to the social malaise of modern 
life?  
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These are some of the reasons why it might be important for our own 
well-being to continue the ancient human tradition of living in mixed 
households or communities. But why might it be important for Nature 
itself that we honour and maintain our ancestral commensal links with 
animals?  
 
Why Nature Needs Us to Live in Company with Animals  
 
If animal companions help to make us less driven, competitive and  
acquisitive, as I argued earlier, then their presence in our lives works 
against the world-destroying ethos of capitalism, with its competitive 
individualism and consumerism. That is to say, if animals help to bring 
us down to earth, deflating our modern ambitions and pretensions by 
exposing them to inter-species scrutiny, then we shall be less anxious to 
remain in the race for success, wealth and power, where it is this race, on 
a mass scale, which is driving the engines of capitalism. Indeed, to the 
extent that  we share our lives with animals, we shall not only be less 
willing but less able to adapt to the regime of order and control, 
efficiency and discipline, which is a prerequisite of capitalist production: 
animals constantly disrupt our life and work with unpredictable 
contingencies - escapes, fights, sudden illnesses, injuries, embarrassing 
lapses. They bring an element of slapstick and anarchy into the cool, 
smart, self-absorbed world of business and public affairs. They make us 
miss work; they muss up the perfect clothes, perfect hair, that are needed 
to assure our 'professionalism', our presentability, in this public world; 
they strew shit and dirt around the manicured gardens, and leave paw 
marks through the tidy houses, that announce our hard-won social status. 
They gently lead us back from the obsessive quest which is definitive of 
the modern ethos  and which is at the root of the environmental crisis: 
the quest to usurp and transcend Nature,9 to place ourselves above and 
beyond its reach, to inhabit a kind of glossy advertiser's version of 
Plato's heaven, in which moth and rust doth not corrupt, because they are 
kept at bay by chemical warfare, and where thieves do not break in and 
steal, because the place is patrolled by security guards. In other words, 
by staying in touch with our animal kin, we stand a greater chance of 
seeing through the dangerous illusions of a world increasingly dedicated 
to capitalist ideals of wealth, power and success that are defined in stark 
opposition to, or at the expense of, Nature.  
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Another reason why, as environmentalists, we should encourage 
commensal relations between animals and people, especially children, is 
that such relations presumably help to engender human empathy towards 
animals in general, including those in the wild. When people discover 
the unique personalities and communicative capabilities of their animal 
friends and familiars, they are logically drawn to credit other animals 
with such potentialities too, and to extend to them, in principle, a degree 
of consideration commensurate with that which, they have realised, is 
due to the animals of their acquaintance. In this way, animal companions 
can serve as 'ambassadors' for animal life generally, awakening in us new 
levels of awareness and responsibility vis a vis the natural world.  
 
It must be admitted, however, that this 'ambassador' argument is, prima 
facie, open to objection. In the first place, what of the rural people, 
whom we have all encountered, who have been in contact with animals 
throughout their lives, yet who nevertheless treat all animals as totally 
inconsiderable robots? Then there are the people who enjoy 
companionate relationships with particular, privileged animals, yet 
continue to handle the rest with callous indifference. How are we to 
account for the fact that daily contact with animals has not, in these 
instances, led to a more considerate attitude towards animals in general? 
 
One way of accounting for this is via the hypothesis that it was the fact 
of domestication itself, in its more grossly instrumental forms, which led 
to our cultural objectification of animals. That is, according to some 
theorists10, in drawing animals into our domiciliary space, and raising 
them within the circle of the human clan, and then slaughtering them for 
food or other purposes, we in fact violated the taboo against violence 
towards kin. The moral gravity of this transgression then required that 
we rationalize our action by denying the moral significance of domestic - 
and by extension, other - animals, reducing them to the status of objects 
that may be produced and consumed without the slightest compunction. 
In other words, to justify the utilization of animals raised, like kin, within 
the human domain, we invented an ideology of animals as objects, which 
effectively closed our eyes to their otherwise manifest subjectivity.  
Ideology unquestionably can blind us to the subjectivity of others, as is 
plainly attested by the phenomena of slavery, racism and sexism in the 
human context. So the mere fact that we keep 'pets', or come into daily 
contact with other animals, will not of itself ensure that we develop 
empathy for them. Communication between self and other can occur only 
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when occlusive ideologies have been exposed and removed. For 
companion animals to serve as moral 'ambassadors' for the animal world 
at large then, anthropocentric prejudices have first to be set aside.  
 
If it is accepted that companion animals do induce in us a new moral 
seriousness about animals generally, then a question arises concerning 
the status of domestic animals used for productive purposes . Does this 
new moral seriousness condemn the utilization of animals for such 
purposes? If so, is it really in the interests of the species in question, 
since those species owe their very existence, at the present time, to the 
fact that they are so utilized. How ironical it would be if the dawning of 
this new moral seriousness led not to an animal renaissance, but to the 
further retreat of animals both from their present evolutionary 
strongholds and from our own lives? The question then, is whether it is 
possible to reconcile empathy for animals with their domestic 
utilization?  
 
The short answer to this question is, I think, that such reconciliation of 
empathy and use is possible to the extent that utilization is of net benefit 
to the animals concerned.  When those animals are considered as species 
rather than as individuals, it is clear that productive forms of 
domestication have been of net benefit to them: domestic animals are 
some of the few animal species still flourishing in a world of declining 
biodiversity. However, the kind of empathy induced by intimate 
relationships with animal companions leads us to consider animals as 
individuals rather than as mere instances of species. So although 
reproductive success at the level of species is obviously a necessary 
condition for an individual's existence, and is in this sense in its interests, 
it is, equally  obviously, not a sufficient condition for the individual's 
well-being.  
 
To reconcile utilization with empathy, we need to be assured that the life 
that our exploitative intentions bestow on an individual domestic animal 
affords both the experiential opportunities and the requisite life span to 
enable it to achieve a significant degree of the form of self-realization 
appropriate to its particular kind. This implies that the use we may 
justifiably make of animals will vary according to their species: what 
may be an acceptable use of one species with a particular set of needs 
and sensibilities may not be acceptable for a species differently 
endowed. In particular, while humane killing of animals who lack any 
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consciousness of death may be admissible, the killing of animals who 
understand and fear death, and who grieve for their own dead (as do 
elephants and perhaps chimps), may be completely inadmissible, 
involving as it would the systematic infliction of  intolerable suffering. 
Such suffering may, from the point of view of the animals in question, 
cancel the benefits of being alive. (This is evidenced by the fact that such 
animals can pine to death when bereaved11).  
 
In short, I think the fact that domestic utilization affords  evolutionary 
niches for certain species, in a world of disappearing niches, is a prima 
facie reason for regarding such utilization as compatible with respect. 
However a full-blown attitude of empathy - such as we develop through 
intimate association with animal companions - requires that the forms of 
utilization we countenance be compatible with the self-realization of the 
animals used, where this implies that different forms and degrees of 
utilization will be appropriate for different species. I would also add that, 
once we have acknowledged the subjectivity and moral significance of 
the animals we use, and the moral gravity of our practices of utilization, 
it becomes incumbent on us to develop cultural expressions of respect, 
gratitude and indebtedness for the lives we have thus dedicated to our 
own ends. In this way, our attitude towards domestic animals can 
develop more affinity with the familial attitudes of hunter-gatherer 
peoples towards the wild species that constitute their prey. 
 
When domestic utilization of animals is subject to the qualifications I 
have outlined above, I think it is not only consistent with empathetic 
concern for the interests of animals: it is actually required by such 
concern. As environmentalists, committed to the maximal preservation of 
non-human life on earth, yet facing the cold, hard fact that in the 21st 
century, the processes of urbanization and industrialization that have 
been synonymous with the disenchantment and tragic devastation of the 
non-human world are only going to accelerate and intensify, don't we 
have to admit that one of our best chances for 'saving Nature' is by 
bringing Nature back into the human domain. We have, for the last few 
centuries, witnessed the runaway humanization of Nature; now let us 
inaugurate the wholesale naturalization of human habitat. Our cities are 
one of the major biological habitats of the future, and our task, as 
environmentalists, is to ensure that they provide the best opportunities 
for non-human life that we can devise. We can do this partly by 
increasing the amount of urban habitat for wildlife. Such habitat can be 
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created by way of indigenous plantings and by permacultural programs 
of food production in the city. Buildings can also be designed or adapted 
to create, rather than exclude, habitat opportunities for wild animals (by 
way of stork-friendly chimneys, for instance, and roofs that 
accommodate bats and nesting birds). However we can also increase the 
urban opportunities for non-human life by finding new ways for animals 
to 'earn their living' in the city.   
 
How might we envisage some of these new ways? The usefulness of 
sheep as lawn-mowers has been appreciated by a church in my own local 
neighborhood, and there is no reason why other urban land-holders, 
including local councils, should not follow suit. Sheep have also been 
used for traffic calming in the Netherlands, and strategic use of horse-
drawn vehicles - for tourist rides or milk deliveries, for instance - could 
serve a similar purpose. City farms afford educational opportunities for 
urban schoolchildren increasingly distanced from the realities of food 
production. The possibilities for reintegrating animals productively into 
urban life are as limitless as our imaginations. However, the principal 
way in which animals can 'earn their living' in the city is still, I think, via 
their companionate role. The exclusive reign of the dog and the cat in 
this connection needs to be challenged, and the adaptability of other 
species to the human hearth and home investigated. There is immense 
scope for the conservation particularly of - sometimes endangered - 
native species in such a program of domestication. Species such as the 
quoll, or native cat, and the fruit bat, are reputed to make affectionate 
and contented hearth companions, and the domestic potentialities of 
many smaller, endangered wallabies, such as quokkas and bettongs, are, 
so far as I am aware, relatively unexplored. (The quokkas on Rottnest 
Island, offshore from Perth, Western Australia,  have already adapted to 
the kind of  semi-tame, dump-side existence which is, according to 
certain evolutionary theorists12, the first step in a species' self-surrender 
to domestication.) Our reluctance, as 'animal lovers', to countenance 
confinement of wild animals, and the loss of autonomy that 
domestication entails, must be off-set, I think, by the recognition that we 
are just another niche in the biosphere, and hence ourselves a part of 
Nature (the niche in question being one which many species have in the 
past successfully  occupied of their own free will).  This reluctance must 
also be offset against the as yet undreamt-of possibilities for 
conservation13 that domestication offers.  
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The 'green' city of the future, then, would be a mixed community rich in 
habitat opportunities for a great diversity of animal species. This 
reintegration of animals into human life would also help to expand 
human imaginative and empathetic horizons, undermining 
anthropocentrism and reinforcing commitment to the protection of the 
non-human world. At the same time, the multiple contacts with animals 
that it would afford would enhance the health and sanity of the human 
population.  
 
To envisage the green city of the future as a mixed community in this 
way would of course involve considerable re-thinking of current urban 
and environmental planning principles. Restrictions on the ownership of 
native animals would have to be revised, and new local council 
regulations allowing for the responsible keeping of a wide range of 'pets' 
would be required. Housing would  be designed with the needs of both 
wild and tame non-human occupants in mind. Such demands on design 
would not in themselves militate against the medium density housing 
currently favoured by environmental town planners, but they would 
require that 'urban consolidation' be counter-balanced by large increases 
in communal green space. Public spaces would also have to be rendered 
more hospitable to animals, with protection from traffic, and areas 
designated and set aside for inter-species exercise (dogs would 
presumably have to be kept apart from donkeys, miniature pigs and 
quokkas, for instance!). Urban planners who currently concentrate on 
high density development for the sake of energy conservation and 
curtailment of urban sprawl forget that, in excluding non-human beings 
from the city and creating human ghettos, they are intensifying the 
anthropocentric mind-set of urban populations, and thereby reinforcing 
the deepest roots of the environmental crisis. The green city is one which 
not only conserves energy and utilizes existing infrastructure, but also 
challenges the traditional conceptual division between humankind and 
Nature, making itself a frontier of ecological possibility and opening its 
people to the degree of contact with non-human life required to awaken 
their ecological sensibilities.  
 
A Responsive World: Some Personal Reflections   
 
These then are some of the reasons why I think that our living with 
animals is important both for us and for them. However, this 
commensality shapes not only our ethical attitudes towards non-human 
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individuals and species, but our very sense of the world. I have not yet 
brought this larger significance of the relationship fully to light, nor can I 
hope to do so with any pretence of completeness. In order to capture a 
little of this cosmological significance however, I would like to recount, 
in these concluding pages, the experiential origins of my own conviction 
that 'without animals, life isn't worth living'.  
 
I grew up surrounded by loving animals on what today would be 
described as a hobby farm, situated on the rural outskirts of Melbourne, 
Australia.. These animals included dogs and cats, ducks, geese, hens, 
and, at one stage, a turkey. There were brief episodes with sheep and 
cows. The main focus of my entire childhood, however, was my ponies. 
My first pony, and the horses that came after her, were my day-long 
playmates and confidants. It was to them that I recited my earliest poems, 
and to them that I ran when I was hurt or excited. They nuzzled me in the 
same soft, considerate way whatever the occasion. I chose their company 
not for want of family and friends, but for its own sake. The form of 
intimacy that grew up between us was qualitatively different from 
anything that could have developed between myself and human persons. 
It was a kind of uncluttered closeness, or being-with, which existed 
despite the fact that our subjectivities were, in terms of content, mutually 
unknowable. We took it for granted, on either side, that this 
unknowability did not matter, that our psyches could touch and pervade 
each other, without need for explanations or self-disclosures, such as 
those conveyable by language. These animals were, for me, 'primary 
others', in the psychoanalytic sense; they were not substitutes for, but 
additional to, significant humans, nor could humans substitute for them. 
My subjectivity - my sense of self and world - was constituted through 
my 'object relations'14 with these animals just as fundamentally as it was 
through my relations with primary human others.  
 
Domestic animals were not the only non-human influences shaping my 
sense of self and world in those early days. There were also kindly 
ancient gum trees on our land - we knew they dated from before 
colonization because they bore canoe scars in their trunks. And there was 
the creek, steeped in elemental mystery for me, yet at the same time busy 
and loquacious, swirling with news of other unknown yet connected 
places. These, together with my animal family, and the wild birds and 
snakes, all contributed to my sense of a world of communicative 
presences beyond the circle of human concerns.  
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Nor was my childhood home the only place which turned my psyche 
outward in this way. There was also an old sheep station on the vast 
western plains of New South Wales, which I occasionally visited in 
school holidays. It was no ordinary sheep station, but, even in those days, 
a relic of an earlier era. The owner, an old timer with eyes as wide as the 
blue desert sky, had been born in the homestead and raised on the 
property, and he ran the place in the pre-mechanical style, with the aid of 
stock ponies, dogs and horse-drawn buggies. We children were out all 
day in the searing sun on the saltbush plains, lunching out of battered 
tuckerboxes, racing our ponies, chasing kangaroos, emus and wild pigs 
with delirious excitement. Back at the homestead, animals filled our 
every waking moment: there were sheep and lambs, of course, as well as 
the ponies, most of whom spent the main part of the year in a large herd 
out on the range, only coming in for a tour of duty now and again, as the 
need arose. (These tough but happy little horses lived to extraordinary 
ages. One died recently at the age of forty-five!)  Cattle, pigs, tribes of 
chooks, ducks and geese, a flock of diminutive long-haired bush goats, 
an army of dogs, and at different times tame emus and kangaroos all 
congregated around the homestead. An old white goat named Snowy and 
a cocoa-coloured hand-reared filly clattered about on the wide back 
verandah. A sack containing a recently orphan joey usually hung from 
the clothes line over the enormous wood-fired stove in the kitchen.  
 
Compassion and fondness for animals jostled, in the daily round, with 
unabashed slaughter and brutality. From my saddle, I witnessed mother 
kangaroos being torn to shreds by dogs, 'for fun'; emus, in flight from our 
young stockman friends, failing to clear a fence, becoming entangled in 
the wire instead, and being bludgeoned to death with a fence-post; and 
back at the homestead, pigs uttering torture-chamber screams as their 
throats were cut and their still-convulsing bodies dropped into troughs of 
scalding water. I sat with the other kids in the back of a jeep on a 
kangaroo-shooting excursion, and as the bodies piled up under our feet, I 
remember the blood of the kangaroos soaking my green felt boots dark 
red. The cruelty shocked me to the core - in fact, it was this which first 
made me aware of my core, a  still, silent, inner place of watching, 
beyond speech. But it did not diminish the overwhelming sense of 
enchantment that this place awakened in me. (Much, much later, I was to 
discover that the old station had had a similar effect on many of the 
people who had been associated with it.) For the enchantment, and the 
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heightened feeling of being alive that accompanied it, arose from the fact 
that animals - and the uncompromising land which decided their fate - 
were the almost exclusive focus of everyone's life there, and the carnage, 
for all its horror, was part of that all-consuming involvement.  
 
When I was fifteen, my family moved into the inner city, and both my 
rural life, and my visits to the sheep station, ceased. However our new 
home overlooked extensive parklands, and I set up house with a dog in 
an old Victorian loft in our backyard, so the transition was not unduly 
traumatic. It was not until I was eighteen, and I abandoned my home and 
my country to live in London, that a keen sense of loss and deprivation at 
last set in. I moved in with a friend who leased a top-storey studio in the 
Kings Road in Chelsea, and for various reasons I was soon trapped in the 
life I had reluctantly chosen to lead there. The apartment was without a 
garden, without the slightest glimpse of green from its high windows. 
The grand old building in which it was located was legendary as one of 
the nerve-centres of the London 'underground'. Artists, writers and rock 
musicians congregated there, and every night, till dawn, the entire 
building was shaken with musical reverberations from the nightclub in 
the basement. People were embarked on what were for them exciting 
adventures with sex and drugs. The joint was unquestionably jumping. 
With comings and goings at all hours, residents and visitors alike were 
charged to the eyeballs with the fizz of glamour, the intoxication of 
notoriety and celebrity.  
 
I alone, it seemed, languished. I felt deadened.  Without any trees in 
sight, with all presence and memory of animals expunged from this 
world, without even a proper sky above me (the London sky appearing 
more like a low ceiling than the soaring invitation to infinity to which I 
was accustomed in Australia), I felt truly 'underground', buried alive. My 
spirit, with its lifelong habit of expansiveness, had to submit for the first 
time to grey urban confinement, to a world built exclusively to human 
specifications, in which no court of appeal existed beyond socially-
prescribed perceptions and perspectives. There was here no turning out 
to a wider world of subtle voices and signals, a world of myriad, at first 
indiscernible, but with patient attention increasingly differentiated, 
responsive presences. Rather, there was a turning in, and a turning up of 
the volume of human-generated and human-directed self-infatuated 
cacophony and chatter. This turning-in found its ultimate expression in 
the essential project of the counter-culture: to transform reality into an 
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inner picture show, a spectacle of hallucinatory images and sexually 
induced sensations orchestrated for our private entertainment. This 
project was, in fact, nothing more than a hip rendition of the old 
transcendental idealism, or solipsistic anthropocentrism, of the Western 
tradition, which places reality in us rather than us in reality.  
 
I had no words, at the time, to name this human introjection of reality, or 
to justify my sense of exile from a world that was truly alive, and, unlike 
the one in which I found myself, a source of true enlivenment. I 
especially had no words to challenge the high claims of Art on which the 
counter-culture rested. Instead, I kept some snails and bare twigs in a jar 
in my room, and gazed at them for months. I retreated into a state of 
fantasy and intense creativity, writing and drawing obsessively, calling 
up from my own deep unconscious the images and motifs I needed to 
survive. I composed song cycles, and stories of origins, before I had 
heard of Aboriginal dreamings. I hung around old book shops and 
antique stores, seeking out illustrations and folk tales that could be 
threaded into my nascent mythologies. I haunted the Natural History 
Museum in South Kensington, with its layer upon layer, colonnade after 
colonnade, of magical animal statuary. Whenever I found a numinous 
image - an old French engraving of a lone seal, for instance, or a Chinese 
painting of wild geese - I enshrined it, hanging it as a religious icon in 
the gallery of my mind. Out of such gathered fragments, and out of my 
own memory, imagination and dreams, I tried to recreate the sense of 
enchantment that had always been the essence of my experience of the 
world, and without which I did indeed find life scarcely worth living.  
 
From the viewpoint of Western psychoanalysis, this sense of 
enchantment is regressive, and signals a failure of individuation in 
infancy. But to adopt this point of view is, of course, to beg the 
metaphysical question. Looking back on my early years now, it seems 
more plausible to me to assume that the ample opportunities for close 
communion with animals that were available to me throughout my 
childhood had opened me to a larger world, a world astir with presence 
or presences that vastly exceeded the human. It was this direct contact 
with unknowable but pervasive presence which instilled in me a sense of 
the sacredness or enchantment of the world, and the potentiality for 
'magic' within it. 'Magic' was, in this context, just the possibility of the 
world's response - the possibility, indeed probability, that the world, 
when invoked in good faith, will respond, though not necessarily in the 
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manner one anticipates or with the results for which one hopes. One 
should certainly not, in my view, rely on this world to fulfil requests or 
afford protection, but if one entreats it simply to reveal itself, to engage 
in an act of communication, then, in my experience, it will generally do 
so, though in its own ever-unpredictable way. I learned this as a child, 
through the receptiveness that my animal familiars created in me, and it 
filled my whole being with a sense of being accompanied, of never being 
alone, a sense of background love, akin to the background radiation of 
which physicists speak. This is a 'love' which has nothing to do with 
saving us from death and suffering, or with making us happy. From the 
viewpoint of the world, death and suffering are just inevitable 
concomitants of individual life. The point for individuals, from this 
perspective, is not to seek to evade these inevitabilities, but to reach 
beyond them - to call into the silence beyond human selfhood in search 
of a reply. This is the moment for which the world has been waiting, and 
in which it will rejoice: the moment when we ask it to speak. To receive 
its reply is to enter a love far greater than the kind of protection and 
indulgence that our traditional importunate forms of prayer expect, for 
that reply signifies that we belong to an animate order, a pattern of 
meaning, from which death cannot separate us, and to which suffering 
only summons us.  
 
I offer these concluding reflections, not as argument, but as testimony 
relating to my own personal sense of the larger import of human-animal 
commensality, especially when that commensality is established in 
childhood. To engage with the unknowable subjectivities of animals, and 
to experience their response to us, is perhaps the principal bridge to 
communication with the unknowable subjectivity of the wider world. To 
experience the world thus, as an ensouled or spiritual thing, will not only 
direct the course of our own self-realization in the most fundamental 
way; it will also ensure an attitude of profound mutuality and awed 
protectiveness towards the world itself. 
 
 
 
Notes  
 
1. Nikkivan der Gaag, 'The Maasai and the Travellers', New 
Internationalist, 266, (1995), pp. 24-25. 
2.   Throughout this paper I shall avoid the demeaning term 'pet', as well 
as the problematic assumption that we can 'own' animals. 
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3.    Information supplied by Australian Companion Animal Council.  
4.  Reported on 'The Science Show', third episode of a series entitled 
'Animal Friends', written and narrated by Dr Jonica Newby, broadcast on 
ABC Radio National on 15 Feb 1997; also reported on 'Australia Talks 
Back', ABC Radio National, 12 February 1997. 
5.   Reported on The Science Show, first episode of the series, 'Animal 
Friends',1 Feb 1997.  
6.    The theory that many of our present day domestic animals initiated 
the process of domestication themselves, in pursuit of their own 
evolutionary advantage, has been explored at length in Stephen 
Budiansky, Covenant with the Wild  (William Morrow, New York, 
1992). 
7.  Deborah Bird Rose, Dingo Makes Us Human  (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992). 
8.  'Mixed community' is Arne Naess' term. See Arne Naess, 'Self-
realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep and 
Wolves', Inquiry  22, (1979), pp. 231-241. 
9.    Many works could be cited in support of this account of modernity; 
see, for instance,  Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature, (Harper and 
Row, San Francisco, 1980); Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery 
of Nature (Routledge, London, 1993), Chapters 1 and 2; Freya Mathews, 
The Ecological Self  (Routledge, London, 1991),  Chapter 1.  
10.. James Serpell, In the Company of Animals (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996), Chapter 11.  
11.   See, for instance, the account of elephant's consciousness of death 
in Joyce Poole, Coming of Age with Elephants (Hodder and Stoughton, 
London, 1996), Chapter 19; for a more ambivalent account of 
chimpanzee attitudes, see Jane Goodall, In the Shadow of Man (William 
Collins, Glasgow, 1971). 
12.   See Budiansky, op cit.  
13.  I am not of course implying here that the movement to maximize 
urban biodiversity should replace wilderness preservation and the 
promotion of wildlife refugia. I am only suggesting that in a world in 
which competition for 'undeveloped' space is progressively going to 
intensify, we need to begin to tap the ecological potential of the 
'developed' space.  
14.  The term 'object relations' is deployed in a branch of psychoanalytic 
theory, known as 'object relations theory', to designate the kinds of 
relations with primary others that an infant  internalizes in the process of 
developing its individual sense of self. It is associated with the work of 
D.W. Winnicott, and later feminist theorists, such as Nancy Chodorow. 
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 BABE: THE TALE OF THE SPEAKING MEAT 
 
Val Plumwood 
 
 'You look a little shy: let me introduce you to that leg      
 of mutton,' said the Red Queen.  Alice-Mutton:   Mutton-
 Alice'. The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a 
 little bow to Alice, and Alice returned the bow, not 
 knowing whether to be frightened or amused. 
  'May I give you a slice?' she said, taking up the a  slice?' 
she said, taking up the knife and fork, and  looking from one 
Queen to the other. 
 'Certainly not,' the Red Queen said, very decidedly: 'it 
 isn't  etiquette to cut anyone you've been introduced to. 
 Remove the joint!'  
    
     Alice Through the Looking Glass 
 
Part 1 
 
 1.  The Unprejudiced Heart 
 2.  The Paradox of the Speaking Meat 
 3.  The Communicative Model 
 
Part 11     - in next issue of this journal 
 
 4.  Communication and Anthropomorphism 
 5.  Meat and the Colonising Contract    
 
 
1 : The Unprejudiced Heart   
I would like somebody somewhere to endow an annual prize for a work 
of art which takes a group of the most oppressed subjects and makes an 
effective and transformative representation of their situation. The work 
would make its audience care about what happens to those oppressed 
subjects and to understand something of the audience's own role in 
maintaining their oppression. It would foster recognition of the 
subjectivity and creativity of the oppressed group and consciousness of 
the need for redistribution of respect and of cultural and material goods. 
Above all, it would help to support and protect them. If these are subjects 
who are conventionally seen as radically excluded, for example as 
beyond the possibility of communication or as embodied in ways  which 
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occasion aversion or anxiety, the prize work should attempt to disrupt  
those violence-prone perceptions.   
 
One of my nominations for such a prize would be the film Babe. Before 
seeing the film, I would have doubted that it was possible to make a  
highly successful film for mass audiences that could do those things for 
one of the most oppressed subjects in our society, the meat pig.  One 
feature that made this achievement possible was that the film 
successfully disrupted the adult/child boundary and created space for 
adults to share certain kinds of openness to and sympathy for animals, 
permitted to children but normally out of bounds for mature adults. This 
is one of the devices which enables the film, like Dick King-Smith's 
prize-winning book The Sheep-Pig on which it is based1, to succeed to a 
remarkable degree in opening for the pig the 'unprejudiced heart' invoked 
in the narrator's opening sentence. It is not just the film's 
problematisation of the concept of meat that makes this film 
philosophically interesting; it also poses many ethico-political questions,  
analogous to questions  in post-colonial theory, about the distinction 
between meat and non-meat animals and the role of the human contract 
with those special more privileged 'pet' animals who can never be 'meat'. 
 
Because the main theme of Babe  turns around the refusal of 
communicative status to animals, the film is of considerable interest for 
philosophical accounts of human-animal relations.  The story provides a 
rich context for thinking about this communicative status, about the 
inadequacy of narrow rationalist accounts of communication, about 
representations of animal communication and the charge of 
anthropomorphism, and about the contradictions and paradoxes 
disclosed when we recognise the meat as a communicative subject. Babe 
repeatedly problematises the kind of prejudice that relegates the other 
that is our food to the category of 'meat', a sphere of radical otherness 
marked by  rational  deficiency, reduction to an impoverished, 
mechanistic concept of 'body',  and exclusion from communicative 
status. The pig Babe soon talks his way smartly around the assumption 
that  because he is a meat animal, he is 'too stupid to understand'; the 
storyline refutes the sheep-dog Fly's dismissal of  sheep-talk as 'just so 
much rubbish, to which she never paid any attention'. The refusal of 
communicative status to animals is a crucial,  formative arena where 
radical exclusion and silencing strategies which affect both humans and 
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animals are developed and perfected. Babe  thus provides many insights 
into closure strategies  as they affect both humans and nonhumans.  
 
Babe also offers a recognition of communicative virtues and 
characteristics as central to both human and nonhuman forms of life, and 
offers a vision of the emergence of communicative forms of relationship 
as victorious alternatives to forms based on violence, domination and 
terror. The film does not explore the ethical and political ambiguities of 
communicative forms, which are potentially rather more compatible with 
oppression than it suggests, and are implicated in the replacement of  
repressive patriarchal models by hegemonic models based on the master 
subject, as in certain forms of liberal democratic politics for example. 
But as Dryzek2  and Plumwood3 have argued, communicative models of 
relationships with nature and animals seem likely to offer us a better 
chance of survival in the difficult  times ahead than dominant 
mechanistic models which promote insensitivity to the others' agency 
and denial of our dependency on them. Babe  crystallises in a useful way 
a clash of models that is critical for our times.  
   
My initial reason for going to the movie however had less to do with 
millennial models and more to do with being homesick -- I was away 
from Australia for a long period and the film had been shot in a shire 
near my home. I hoped to hear again the sounds of the bush -- those 
small but intensely evocative background calls -- especially the local 
birds and frogs which appear in the background on most soundtracks --
that creep up on you unawares to create powerful  longings for a  much-
loved  place.  But when I took my seat in the darkened cinema, 
something else made me cry too, with sorrow and shame for my own 
complicity in the dominant cultural tradition of rational human mastery 
over animals and nature -- as well as everything else considered beneath 
the master realm of reason.  These were the powerful opening scenes of 
Babe showing the terrible cruelty of the intensive pig farms in which the 
pig Babe, treated as living meat, is  introduced  to us as narrative subject.  
 
These visions of hell  took on special power and poignancy for me 
because at the time I saw the film, I was living in the second highest  
U.S. state for intensive hog production. The state of North Carolina was 
a place where one rarely saw farm animals out in the open and many of 
the rivers and estuaries were seriously degraded or under assault from 
the toxic run-off generated by the intensive factory farms. Many of the  
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huge pig 'slaughter facilities' in the U.S. employ largely  prison labour. 
The work of those who labour on the killing floor of these massive 
facilities slaughtering up to 15,000 pigs a day is so terrible and poorly 
paid  that only the slave-like workforce of the carceral system, or those 
coerced by other forms of desperation such as  indentured immigrants, 
are available as workers.  The concentration camps too employed some 
categories of prisoners to organise, imprison  and execute others. The 
treatment of the pigs and that of the prisoners has much in common; in 
both cases, the intense segregation of the gulag ensures that the middle 
class rarely has to confront the hidden connection between its ugly and 
violent reality and their own comfortable and tidy lives. The speech of 
both pigs and prisoners is erased or delegitimated, and both are reduced 
to living meat. As C. Stone Brown argues, 'African Americans are the 
flesh that maintains a profitable "prison industry".'4 As disciplinary 
democracy normalises massive incarceration and more of us become 
either prisoners or keepers, the fate of nonhuman and human prisoners 
increasingly converges.    
 
The nightmarish opening scenes of Babe  showed an ugly gulag reality 
that was all around but which was banished from thought and sight, and 
generally treated, even by the animal liberation movement, as too well 
established for serious contest. In these circumstances, who could  avoid 
being immediately caught up in the little pig's plight, or avoid comparing 
the misery of the incarcerated animals with the consumptive pleasures of 
the over-privileged humans the next shots cut to?   The filmic technique 
at this point had us crossing that crucial animal/human subject boundary 
with dizzying speed, so fast that our usual distancing defences did not 
have time to cut in and tell us that these subjects are not at all 
comparable, that humans count and pigs don't. Who could avoid 
comparing the pigs' misery with the humans' pleasure, or avoid thoughts 
of concentration camps and gas chambers as the pig mothers were torn 
from their children and cattle-prodded into that  terrible night journey 
from which there was no return?  
 
The answer, of course, to this question is: 'quite a lot of people'. Many 
people didn't see  animals or animal liberation as the topic of the film, 
and some reviewers seemed to think it was all about how you could cross 
gender and class boundaries and burst categories to make yourself 
anything you wanted to be, even a sheep-pig, if you had enough  
determination and willpower. For them it was a sophisticated 
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postmodern-neoliberal Animal Farm allegory about personal 
responsibility, individual merit rewarded, and trying harder. Babe  does 
have valid things to say to a human audience about not staying in the 
boxes convention puts you into, but the message here is also relevant to 
breaking down hierarchies of considerability which serve to confine 
nonhumans. Some were open to such a metaphorical message about 
stereotyping and limitation in the human case, but closed to it in the 
nonhuman case. Their inability  to see how animals themselves could be 
more than conceptual instruments for humans and could themselves be a 
topic for a 'serious' film points to their entrapment by a conceptual 
framework that assigns animals a status beneath subjectivity and 
seriousness. Both assignments are effective defences against hearing the 
story of the speaking meat that Babe  articulates. The pig Babe speaks 
from the most delegitimated subject position possible in our society,  that 
of the meat,  and we have developed strategies for blocking out and not 
hearing the speech of those in that position. We could not continue the 
sorts of meat practices the pig-human gulag system is based upon 
without these kinds of strategies.  One of the great strengths of the film is 
that it invites us to challenge some of these paradoxes,  blocks and 
erasures.  
  
2: The Paradox of the Speaking Meat  
In the opening scenes of the factory farm we are introduced to the piglet 
Babe as the film's main narrative subject (marked by the subject's theme 
on the soundtrack, among other marks of subjecthood). We open with a 
shot showing real piglets waking in expressive communication, and then 
see one of these meat-subjects expressing his/her5 sorrow at the loss of 
his mother, and his fear as he is seized by strangers and carried away to 
be raffled. As his mother is prodded into the truck, Babe utters his grief 
so fleetingly and naturally that we hardly notice that our usual 
assumptions have been turned on their heads. The meat animal is being 
presented to us as an expressive, narrative subject -- the meat is 
speaking. There are several disruptions here.  What is disrupted 
immediately is the Cartesian stereotype of the machine-animal, the 
dominant model which enables the ontological presence,  mindlike and 
communicative characteristics of animals to be so utterly denied in the 
factory farm, where their entire lives are defined and distorted by the 
function of serving human appetite. There is paradox in the concept of 
speaking meat Babe confronts us with, precisely because the concept of 
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meat totally erases that speaking position; there is no possibility of 
encountering the meat  as expressive, narrative subject. 
 
An inquiry into the concept of meat provides a useful route into 
understanding how  'taxonomy' connects ontology with ethics -- how 
certain strategies of representation normalise oppression by narrowing 
ethically relevant perception, erasing key ethical dimensions of 
situations, and sometimes  even  making the other complicit in their own 
oppression through internalising oppressive forms of identity. As Carol 
Adams has argued6, the concept of meat justifies oppression by hiding 
responsibility for death and the causal connection between the 
production of meat and the animal's death. The backgrounding, erasure 
or denial of these connections in the abstractly quantitative and 
commodified concept of meat Adams terms 'absent referent'. 'Absent 
referent' involves a complex process of splitting which renders 
unavailable not only the act of killing which makes meat available as a 
commodity6, but any recognition of connection between the meat and 
those who consume it.  To achieve this the concept of meat must 
simultaneously establish several profound splits or radical exclusions,  
between process-product, mind-body, and us-them. The first of these is 
inherent in the commodity form and involves a radical dissociation 
which denies the connection between the processes set in motion by our 
intentions and the end product of commodified,  quantitatively-
specifiable flesh. The second radically dissociates the subjectivity which 
sets these processes in motion from that of its victim, denying their 
kinship as socially connected, purposive and communicative beings, and 
presenting the victim reductively as flesh. 'You looks at us' says King-
Smith's wise old sheep Maa 'and you sees lamb chops'.   
 
The third background assumption involved in modern industrial society's 
concept of meat as commodity denies the possibility of human 
consumers themselves ever taking the form of meat,  by a background 
assumption of a hierarchy of use and considerability which is linked to 
an alleged hierarchy of mental and communicative capacities between 
species, with humans of course at the top. We may daily consume other 
animals in their billions, but we never position ourselves reciprocally as 
food for these others, not even worms.  As consumers of meat who can 
never suppose ourselves be meat, we assume the god-position above the 
action, positioning our identity outside the framework of ecological 
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exchange. The conjunction 'human meat' becomes almost as unthinkable 
a possibility as the idea of being  introduced to the speaking meat. 
 
The concept of meat is a form of life7 in which taxonomy structures our 
moral vision via the ethical and epistemological possibilities it discloses 
or denies.8 These sets of background denials enable the presentation of 
the other in the instrumental terms that Marilyn Frye has identified as 
belonging to the arrogant perspective in which viewers 'organise 
everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests',9 in 
this case, in terms of a strong  instrumental reductionism which identifies 
the other with what is only a part of their being, the part that  is of use to 
us as flesh. Since eurocentric culture identifies the human in radically 
contrasting terms which emphasise, rather than suppress or deny we, in 
contrast, are identified as humans in terms which emphasise, rather than 
suppress or deny, our subjectivity, and which tend to background our 
bodily aspects of identity, beings identified as meat become radically 
Other: not only can we never be included in the category of meat 
ourselves, we  can never  be introduced to the meat. These assumptions 
together involve a profound and multiple denial of kinship with meat.   
 
There is injustice in each of  these  denials and reductive modes of 
conception. There is injustice for a communicative and ethical being in 
being conceived systematically in ways that refuse recognition of this 
status and these characteristics. There is injustice for such a being in 
being conceived reductively as body, first because such conception 
singles its referent out for treatment as radically less than it is, and 
second because such an instrumental reductionism defines the other in 
terms that assume  the right of a  'higher' group supposedly above the 
process of exchange  to treat them as a resource for their ends. Animals 
so conceived are subject to both radical exclusion (as having a radically 
different nature discontinuous from that of the human meat consumer) 
and extreme homogenisation -- replaceable and interchangeable, their 
individuality submerged, they 'drown in the anonymous collectivity' of 
the quantitative commodity form meat. The radical exclusion aspect of 
the meat concept denies kinship and generates a conceptual distance or 
boundary between humanity and its 'meat' which blocks sympathy, 
reduces the risk of identification with those so designated, and silences 
them as communicative beings. The reductiveness of the meat concept 
permits a conceptual strategy designed to block recognition of these 
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injustices, and its disruption in the concept of  the speaking meat is one 
source of the flavour of paradox  that lingers around  that idea.   
 
But from the injustice of industrial society's institution of meat as 
commodity, and the moral cowardice and evasion of the associated 
conceptual strategies of denial, we cannot conclude that there is no moral 
alternative to a universalised vegetarianism, that there are no other, less 
ethically problematic ways to resolve the tensions between conceiving 
nonhumans both as communicative others and as food. In the complex 
biological exchange which sustains all our lives, we must all gain 
sustenance at the expense of the other, 'the one living the other's death, 
and dying the other's life', in the words of Heraclitus. Shagbark Hickory 
outlines an alternative, non-reductive  perspective on this exchange 
which does not refuse the moral complexities and perplexities involved:  
 
 For most or all American Indians food (plant as well as 
 animal) is kin. Relationships to plants and animals as, on 
 the one hand, food and, on the other hand, kin creates a 
 tension which is dealt with mythically, ritually, and 
 ceremonially, but which is never denied. It is this  refusal to 
deny the dilemma in which we are  implicated in this life, a 
refusal to take the way of bad faith,  moral supremacy, or self-
deception which constitutes a  radical challenge to our 
relationships to our food. The  American Indian view that 
considerability goes "all the way  down" requires a response 
considerably more sophisticated  than those we have seen in 
the West, which consist either in  drawing lines of moral 
considerability in order to create an  out-group, or in constructing 
hierarchies of considerability  creating de facto  out-groups in 
particular cases.10 
 
As Shagbark Hickory notes, some forms of vegetarianism remain trapped 
in the Western strategies of denial and radical exclusion which create 
further out-groups,  merely redrawing the boundary of otherness in a 
different place, at the border of animality rather than humanity. This 
comes about because, as we notice, the dominant Western view places 
humans above the systematic exchange processes in which all creatures 
become (eventually) food for others, privileging humans as eaters for 
whom all others are available as food but who are never themselves 
available as food. Some movements toward recognition of kinship 
between humans and animals thus take the misguided form of attempting 
to extend the privilege of this problematic positioning of humans above 
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the exchange process outward to other (selected) groups of animals. At 
the same time, such forms of recognition are of necessity highly limited 
in the class to which such recognition can be extended. They can only 
result in enlarging the class of the privileged, instead of a recognition of 
the kinship of all living things in the biological exchanges of food, and 
in a retention of the strategies of erasure and denial for the excluded 
groups.  
 
In contrast, the indigenous recognition that the central philosophical 
problem of human life is that 'all our food is souls' points towards non-
reductive practices and understandings of food that  resolve the moral 
failings  of 'bad faith, moral supremacy, [and] self-deception' Shagbark 
Hickory finds implicit in the dominant Western meat concept. However, 
to the extent that these alternative understandings of food form part of a 
different 'form of life', in Wittgenstein's sense11, they are not readily 
available, either practically or conceptually,  within the context of 
contemporary industrial life and its  commodified food relationships. 
Conversely, the fact that vegetarianism may usually be the course which, 
in the context of such a commodity society, will best minimise our 
complicity in injustice towards others, does nothing to support the 
eurocentric conclusion that vegetarianism is a universal  moral 
requirement for all people in all societies in all situations.12  
 
In contexts where the multiple denials of kinship involved in meat 
cannot be successfully made, for example in the case where we have 
'been introduced' and have intimate and individual knowledge of the 
particular animal to be eaten, we tend to experience powerful tensions 
and often profound discomforts over its inclusion in the category of 
meat. These tensions and discomforts find expression in traditional 
contexts such as New Guinea, where pigs that have been raised as part of 
a family are never slaughtered by that family but are exchanged. 
Alternative Westerners (for example, subsistence farmers) who aim to 
create 'spiritual' food practices in opposition to the dominant 
commodified ones sometimes argue that meat eating is ethically 
acceptable if you 'take responsibility'. This phrase I think indicates a 
search for alternative food practices that avoid the processes of ethical 
erasure I have identified in the practices of meat. 
 
In a Western context of individualised ethical choice, such alternatives 
would have to mean, for example, the eater taking personal responsibility 
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for the eaten animal's fate (which in the case of a domestic animal would 
include responsibility for the quality of its life as well as for its death), 
and bearing the blame for unnecessary suffering. That would mean 
finding ways to acknowledge fully the animal's 'soul' and its kinship, and 
to express gratitude and reciprocity, that is, to acknowledge a reciprocal 
availabiltiy as food for others. Such conditions, demanding even in the 
context of traditional communities, are very difficult to realise, both 
materially and psychologically, in the context of contemporary urban 
Western life. To the extent that they require establishing new shared 
cultural practices and meanings rather than just new individual practices, 
ethically sensitive carnivorous practices are not culturally available in 
that context.  
 
The paradox of the speaking meat is both the product of  a particular 
social context, and an indicator of some of the most significant moral 
failings of that context. The western solution to the moral dilemmas of 
food is the creation of a set of moral dualisms, involving a sharp 
discontinuity between those who deserve and those who are beyond 
ethical consideration. As we have seen, the speaking meat forces us to 
confront the way this moral dualism and discontinuity is based on 
reductionism, denial and silencing.  Our civilisation's orientation to the 
creation of moral dualisms may be one reason for its technological 
dominance, since it removes any constraints of respect which might 
otherwise hold back development, but it remains an ever ready source of 
corruption of our ethical practices. The silencing solutions of  moral 
dualism are always potentially capable of extension  to selected groups 
of humans counted as lesser in their humanity, and we have seen this 
extension made many times in this century. Although this silencing 
possibility is present in any human society,  it must be greatly reinforced 
by  the entrenchment of the dualist model in the basic case of food.  
 
3 : The Communicative Model  
The overarching model which subsumes the commodity model of the 
animal and its specific modes of and motives for reduction is the 
Cartesian-mechanistic reduction of the non-human animal to its body, 
and the associated refusal to recognise non-human animals as akin to 
human ones in the possession of mind, intention and communication. 
Mary Midgley13  and Barbara Noske14 are two philosophers who have 
pointed out that the moral failings implicit in the modern,  commodified 
concept of meat find their philosophical progenitor in Cartesian  
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rationalism and the mechanistic model. The rationalist-mechanistic 
model of the animal is a key part of  the relation between modernity and 
the nonhuman world, and its rationality is expressed both in reductive 
concepts like meat and in the practices of the factory farm.14 The 
mechanistic model erases the possibility of communication by denying 
mindlike properties to non-humans; ideals of manipulation and 
instrumental rationality are at odds with communicative ideals and with 
the conception of the other as a communicative subject. Babe  confronts 
us with the conflict between the mechanistic model of the factory farm, 
and the communicative model of human/animal relations the film 
ultimately vindicates. This alternative communicative model is located in 
the film in the romantically presented contrast space of the Hoggett's 
family farm, where it struggles to emerge in the unconventional role 
tolerated for the former meat animal Babe and Babe's communicative 
reformation of relationships with the sheep. But the farm itself is the site 
of conflict between the communicative and the Cartesian-reductive 
models, for it too contains the sinister meat house and the animal regimes 
based on fear and force. The conflict between these models is also 
represented in the form of the conflict within the taciturn farmer and 
between him and the more conventional  farm wife.  
 
Nevertheless, animal liberationists have some justification for viewing 
the film's major implicit contrast between the factory farm and the family 
farm with a sceptical eye. To say that the family farm setting of Babe  is 
highly romanticised is an understatement. A cynic might say that the 
family farm parallels the family as the site of mystifying  representations 
and idealisations. The contrasts of Babe  hide the fact that the family 
farm model is compatible with, and normally involves, many oppressive 
animal husbandry practices;  the destination of most of its animal food-
producing units is ultimately the market, and all that has changed is the 
indoor setting. This would be, I think, to ignore the fact that moral 
differences of degree can be important; it would be like saying that there 
is no moral difference between being a worker on a production line and 
an inmate of a concentration camp, because both involve some degree of 
reduction and instrumentalisation. If there is a moral difference between 
the smaller scale farm and the animal gulag,  however, there is also 
normally a lot more continuity than Babe  makes visible.  
 
But to dismiss the implicit contrast of Babe  in this way  would be to 
miss the point that Babe  also makes visible a new possibility - the 
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possibility of replacing a dominant model of mechanistic relations by a 
communicative one which recognises the animal's status as a 
communicative and moral being and revolutionises the moral basis of 
relationships with domestic animals. Whether this is compatible with 
farming as we know it remains an open question, but one the film 
deserves credit  for raising.  Babe  leaves us in no doubt that meat is 
violence, and it posits a model of communication in opposition to that  
violence, and hence a new vision of relations to domestic animals. It 
does not explore the puzzles in that vision, leaving us with various 
paradoxes to chew on. But its communicative model presents a final 
vision of some power, including the triumph of the communicative skills 
and ethic Babe has acquired from the maternal wisdom of the sheep and 
various other proxy mothers.  
 
Babe's status as a communicative subject has received so little attention 
in the monstrous regime of the gulag that  he does not even have an 
individual name. But, as we soon discover when Babe is removed 
through the device of  the raffle to the relatively enlightened  world of 
the family farm, Babe's status as a communicative subject still has many 
obstacles to overcome to gain recognition. Before arrival at the farm, 
Babe is initially just a 'worthless little runt', an object to be weighed, 
raffled off and eaten. In the idealised world of the Hoggett's traditional 
farm, Babe's communicative capacities are  initially dimly, then more 
clearly, recognised by Farmer Hoggett. But they are not initially 
recognised by his wife,  who addresses him as 'you lucky little pork chop' 
and looks forward to Babe's transformation into the familiar commodity 
form of 'two nice hams, two sides of bacon, pork chops, kidneys, liver, 
chitterling, trotters etc'.  
 
The film version of Mrs. Hoggett, unlike the book version,  is made to 
represent the most closed, convention and consumer-bound side of the 
human character.15 Although this elaboration of conflicting perspectives 
adds some richness to the film's themes and characterisation, the linking 
of the conflict  between the mechanistic and communicative perspectives 
in this way with gender introduces elements of androcentrism into the 
story, obscures the real connections between gender and consumerism 
and between gender and the mechanistic model,16 and generates 
contradictory messages about the affirmation of animality. This emerges 
in the film's derogatory representation of  the farm wife in animalistic 
terms and in the implicit demeaning of  women's understanding and tasks 
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as consumeristic and materialistic, in contrast to the more 'spiritual' 
orientation of the father/farmer.  Babe's subjectivity is recognised by 
several animal foster mothers, the dog Fly and the sheep Maa, who 
develop Babe's communicative and social abilities in the best maternal 
traditions. But although Babe's unusual communicative abilities must 
ultimately derive from these various mothers (who must have included 
the original pig mother he missed so much), it is their completion and 
recognition by the father/farmer, represented as the 'unprejudiced heart', 
that are positioned in the movie as the key transformative elements for 
Babe and for the culture more generally.    
 
The farmer is, for reasons the film leaves unexplored, open to certain 
possibilities of animal communication the others around him are closed 
to. By various communicative deeds, Babe gradually earns the farmer's 
recognition of his subjectivity, or so he believes, but is devastated by the 
final -- incredible -- discovery of his status as meat, revealed to him by  
the jealous cat.  This apparent betrayal, (of almost biblical proportions) 
by the father, almost kills Babe, who, like the duck Ferdie, cannot bear to 
live as only meat. At this point in the story, as at the beginning and the 
end, Babe is positioned as a Christ figure, the feminised, dependent son 
who is affirmed and revived by the farmer/father's recognition and love, 
expressed in the dance of life. Together Babe and the farmer go on to 
accomplish the apparently impossible feat of opening closed minds and 
demonstrating Babe's unrecognised communicative ability to the world. 
We are invited to conclude that this revolutionises the treatment of pigs 
and of farming generally,  reformulating it as an activity based on 
communication rather than force and violence.  The communicative ethic 
is also strongly represented by the (female) sheep, whose persistent faith 
in and exemplification of the virtues and values of communication and 
non-violence is essential to their ultimate victory over the reductive 
violence of traditional relationships.  
 
Communicative relationships open up new moral possibilities for 
organising life in ways that can negotiate conflicts of interests,  build 
agreement, trust and mutuality, and avoid instrumentalism and the 
imposition of the will of one party on the other by force. Communicative 
relations don't necessarily follow out those possibilities  however, and it 
is important not to romanticise the communicative model, which does 
not automatically eliminate the dynamic of power, either in terms of 
equality of access, of hierarchy in forms of communication, or of the 
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structuring  of communication in hegemonic ways. There are various  
strategies for taking back the greater equality communicative models 
appear to offer. Rationalist models which treat communication as an 
exercise in pure, abstract, neutral and universal reason, and which 
delegitimate the more  emotional and bodily forms and aspects of 
communication,  operate to exclude nonhumans from full communicative 
status just as they exclude various human others accorded lower human 
status as further from the rational ideal. These rationalist models exclude 
the forms of communication associated with animals along with the 
forms of communication associated with women, with non-western 
cultures and with less 'educated' classes.17  
 
Communicative models which allow us to overcome these exclusions for 
humans will also help us to recognise non-human animals in their denied 
aspects as communicative beings, but an excessive emphasis on 
communication and its use as a criterion of moral worth or value would 
remain problematic for nonhumans in basing itself on a capacity which 
may still be  highly characteristic of humanity, and in biasing our 
valuations heavily towards those species most similar to ourselves. To 
overcome this implicit anthrocentrism, a communicative model would 
need to be part of plural set of grounds for valuation,  rather than its 
unique and exclusive basis, and to be sensitive to communicative 
capacities within species as well as to their capacities for communication 
with humans.  
 
If the film's communicative vision offers hope of moving on to a new 
stage beyond mechanism, it also leaves us with many tantalising 
questions about this new stage which arise from the ambivalence of 
communication. Will communication be on our terms or theirs? Will 
Babe's communicative abilities be used  for the good of the animals or 
for that of the farmer? If the film's account of the moral development of 
the farmer (reaching its climax in the step-dance) offers a vision of the 
small farm as a putative future enterprise of love and communication 
with nature and animals,  the film also casts little light on the question of 
what the communicative farm would be like. Will the new 
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm 
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit 
ways?  Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic 
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand 
to the more repressive  forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance 
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they replaced?  The distinction between democracy and despotism is 
supposedly built on such a contrast, but as it becomes increasingly clear 
how little our own society resembles the democratic ideal  of free and 
open dialogue to which all have access, it also becomes clear how our 
communicative abilities can be used to control and imprison us. A new 
communicative stage of human-nature relationships would need to place 
such questions at the centre of its critical thought: at this level, the tale of 
the speaking meat  has only just begun.   
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AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR PETER SINGER 
 
 
Denise Russell: Professor Singer, I would like to begin with a question 
concerning ethical issues in relation to animals. What difference do you 
see from twenty years ago?  
 
Peter Singer: I think the big difference is that there is no question now 
that animals are a significant ethical issue. They are part of the agenda of 
any debate about the nature of ethics and the reach of ethical concerns, or 
in other words: how far do our ethical concerns extend? When I first 
became interested in these issues, towards the end of 1970, they were 
really completely new issues. It was very hard to find any on-going 
discussion about ethics and animals. There was really no one writing 
about it, although there were many works of philosophy being written 
where you can see, looking at it now, that they just basically overlooked 
the problem. I mean, for example, accounts of the nature of equality 
which explain equality by saying all humans are equal because all 
humans have interests, in that they can all suffer or enjoy life and this is 
a basic human right, etc. etc. Then the rest of the argument goes on, 
entirely about humans and this is supposed to be a basis for human 
equality. Obviously the criterion for equality just given includes non-
human animals as well as humans and that would seem to imply by the 
nature of the argument that animals are in some way equal as well. Yet 
the author does not even pause to say why animals are not included 
because the question does not even occur to him.  There were quite a few 
articles being written around that time like that. There were also one or 
two rather peripheral articles that did raise the question of animals but 
usually in order to dismiss it with some fairly rhetorical expression like: 
'Of course they lack the intrinsic dignity that humans have' or 'Animals 
are not ends in themselves. They don't have intrinsic worth.'  So there 
was no serious discussion at the beginning of the 1970's about this issue. 
And that has completely changed. Clearly it is an issue that is on the 
philosophical agenda and it is on political and social agendas as well. 
You only have to open up any text book of applied ethics or 
contemporary moral issues and you are pretty sure to find some 
discussion about the moral status of animals or our ethical obligations to 
animals.   
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Denise Russell:  Another question I wanted to ask has to do with animal 
rights. I think in this area that talk about rights has some rhetorical force 
but a rights position is difficult to defend. In your early work you did talk 
a little about rights and then you had that paper in the mid-eighties where 
you tried to distance yourself from Regan's position on animal rights. I 
wonder what your position is now. Do you think that it is useful to talk 
in terms of animal rights or  would you prefer to stay with a more strictly 
utilitarian perspective? 
 
Peter Singer: I think my view has always been that the grounding for 
ethical consideration in relation to animals is in terms of their capacity to 
feel, and in terms of the wrongness of inflicting pain on beings 
irrespective of their species.  I don't think my view has ever been one 
that was really grounded in terms of rights. It is true, as you say, that in 
the first edition of Animal Liberation  I talked about animals having a 
right to equal consideration of their interests, and the  differentiation that 
I drew later on was merely because I felt that this had been 
misinterpreted into the view that I was defending an animal rights 
position, by which I mean that the grounding of the whole position is 
based on some claim about rights.  I never thought that that was really 
very helpful. So I think the position I hold now is still essentially that, 
i.e. that the grounding is not in terms of rights but on the other hand that 
rights may be useful as a kind of short-hand, particularly in the political 
arena, where so much of these discussions is couched in terms of rights 
that you have to quite deliberately avoid the language of rights.  That 
somehow marks you out from other issues where people will debate 
about whether the foetus has a right to life, species have a right to exist 
and so on. So I am certainly prepared to use the term 'rights' in that 
political context, not so much as a philosopher, but more as a 
campaigner.  More recently in The Great Ape Project  we actually start 
the book with a declaration on behalf of the great apes which claims that 
they have three basic rights, namely the rights to life, liberty and 
protection from torture; but that is quite clearly being used as a statement 
in the political domain, not as a philosophical grounding. The point of 
this is simply that we are always talking about rights for humans - we 
have got the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and so on.  
We are trying quite deliberately to put the rights of the non-human great 
apes there alongside those of humans.  
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Denise Russell:  When you use rights talk for political purposes, what do 
you do when you are confronted with people who mention the issue of 
conflicting rights? Say if you are talking about moral vegetarianism and 
somebody says, what about the human right to eat animals? 
 
Peter Singer: Well at that point I think you have to stop just using 
'rights' as a political slogan and you have to ask what is the basis for 
what we are talking about, and then you have to say, well really what we 
want is equal consideration of interests. We have to consider the interests 
of humans in eating and the interests of animals in not being made to 
suffer and so on. And of course if the humans can't survive without 
eating animals then there is a real clash, a real conflict of interests. If on 
the other hand what we are talking about is whether humans will 
continue to eat pork rather than tofu, when they can be nourished just as 
well or better by the tofu, then it is a less serious clash. So I do think you 
have to get away from the rights language at this point otherwise you just 
get a swapping of intuitions: 'Well I think I have a right to eat'; 'No, I 
think animals have a right to life' and that doesn't get any further.  
 
Denise Russell: Yes. On the Great Ape Project, would you like to bring 
us up to date with what is happening with that? 
 
Peter Singer: Yes. The Great Ape Project now has co-ordinators in a 
number of different countries, in the United States, in England, in 
Germany, in Sweden, in Finland, in Taiwan, in New Zealand and other 
places as well, and we are working on different levels simultaneously.  
On the one hand we are just trying to raise the general awareness of the 
issue of why we demarcate ourselves from apes. The whole point of the 
project is to use the animals who are most like us, and who are best 
studied and about whom we know most in terms of their self-awareness 
and their capacities, as a kind of bridge to narrow the gulf between 
humans and animals and to say, look, we can't classify the animal 
kingdom into humans and animals. There are beings who are very like 
us, and there are beings who are less like us, and you have got to look at 
them differently.  The Great Ape Project is a way of asking what is it that 
is so special about being human?  There is clearly a great overlap 
between the capacities of the other great apes and our own.  On one level 
we are trying to raise consciousness about that issue and on another level 
we are working to try to change the law wherever that is possible. So we 
are having on-going discussions with lawyers concerned about animal 
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rights issues in a number of different countries about possibilities for 
bringing lawsuits, the purpose of which would be to have animals, or 
particularly say a chimpanzee, declared to be a being with a legal 
standing of its own rather than a thing; in other words, we want apes to 
be, not property but beings who have rights in themselves.  So that is 
another level, the legal level. And then we have also been working quite 
specifically where we have seen opportunities for particular apes. In the 
talk tonight I'll be showing a video about one particular ape that was in a  
laboratory and who we managed to get out.  
 
Denise Russell: Could you say a little bit more about the lawsuits? Are 
these designed just with the aim of trying to get apes recognized as 
beings in their own right and not property? 
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, that is the basic idea of it, to take that kind of step, 
that kind of breakthrough. Obviously ideally we would like them to be 
declared legal persons with the same basic rights that humans have.   
 
Denise Russell:  Are you familiar with the case which  was argued in 
connection with the dolphins who Herman and his research team were 
studying? 
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, the Hawaii case.  
 
Denise Russell: The people who took the dolphins and released them 
were trying to put the argument that the dolphins shouldn't be regarded 
as property but as persons.  
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, in a sense that is the kind of case we are running.  
We think that that case was perhaps run prematurely. There wasn't either 
the climate or the preparations for it and I don't think that dolphins are 
the ideal species either because there isn't really enough established 
about dolphins in the same way that there is about chimpanzees for 
example. But yes, we would like to run a case like that which had a 
better chance of success.  
 
Denise Russell: Does it have to be property or persons. Is there any other 
way of arguing this within Western laws?  
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Peter Singer:  There is a possibility for some sort of intermediate status, 
if that is what you mean and there have been some American and some 
European decisions suggesting that animals may have a kind of 
intermediate status. Here is an example at a very crude level: normally, if 
a garage takes your car and negligently does something which means that 
your car is written off, what you get back is the market value of the car. 
In the past there were cases in which a vet or someone else did that to a 
cat, and all that the owner got back was the market value of the cat. Now 
recently there have been cases in which it was held that the owner would 
be held entitled to loss and suffering in some way analogous to that 
which one might have for a member of the family. So it is not the market 
value of the property, or the cost of replacing it anymore.  This is a tiny 
incremental breakthrough in the idea that animals are not just property, 
but obviously we don't feel that that goes nearly far enough.  
 
Denise Russell:  I thought on reading the case about the dolphins that 
having to argue that they were persons might have been a very difficult 
argument to run, given the prevalent attitudes. If the lawyers had tried to 
argue that they shouldn't be regarded as property even though they are 
not persons then perhaps they might have had more success. I was just 
wondering about the legal technicalities here. 
 
Peter Singer:  I think the law has been a bit dichotomous. It has divided 
things into property and persons and there are just now these suggestions 
of a kind of half-way status but I suppose people were not very clear 
about it - in the dolphin case people were probably not clear that there 
was that possibility. 
 
Denise Russell:  One other question that I wanted to ask you was about 
the dispute that sometimes crops up between people who are looking at 
the interests of animals and people who see themselves as looking at  the 
interests of the environment more broadly. I was wondering whether you 
had any thoughts on that sort of debate and the point that some people in 
the environment movement suggest that those who have a strong interest 
in the welfare of animals are really operating from a liberal humanist 
perspective and are limited because of that.   
 
Peter Singer:  Yes, there is clearly a sense in which the views that I 
hold, although they are quite radical in their implications for how we 
should change our  relationships with animals, are also relatively 
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conventional in the way they derive from an easily recognisable western 
philosophical tradition - you could call it  liberal-humanist or you could 
call it utilitarian. There is nothing radically different or new about it. I 
see that as its strength, in that it means that it is something that you can 
really  use to argue with I see that as its strength, in that it means that it is 
something that you can really  use to argue with people who are also in 
that tradition - and most people in our society are - and within their own 
terms you can convince them that the views that they hold are 
inconsistent, or more broadly incoherent, or make arbitrary distinctions 
that can't be defended. If on the other hand you switch to a kind of 
ecological holistic perspective you really detach yourself from all those 
traditions and it is much harder for you to bring your view into a sharp 
confrontation with the views that most people hold. It's almost, and this 
is a bit of a parody, like saying what people used to say in the '60's, 
unless you drop acid and turn on you won't be able to see what I am 
talking about.  Most people are not going to do that so the question is 
how that kind of argument is really going to be made to work. I guess 
that is the problem for me too. I'd like to really understand how we can 
defend the interests of the ecology as a whole and for its own sake.  I 
have no difficulty with arguments for preserving an ecosystem that are 
based on the interests of sentient beings.  For example, we can claim that 
the preservation of a wetlands is vitally important because without it 
thousands of birds, frogs and other sentient beings will die.  But what if 
there were no sentient beings who would be any worse off if a particular 
local ecosystem perished? Can we still find good arguments to say that it 
would be wrong to cause the ecosystem to perish? What would those 
arguments be like? This is a genuine question: I am not saying that there 
are no such arguments, I am asking for an account of what they might be 
based on. 
 
Denise Russell:  Where does that leave you in thinking about the 
environment as a whole?  
 
Peter Singer:  I don't think that in any way it makes it difficult for me to 
argue that it is very important to defend the integrity of ecological 
systems. But the way I would do so is not by saying that ecosystems have 
intrinsic rights. Still less would it be by personifying ecosystems and 
treating them as agents or conscious beings or something of that sort. It 
would rather be by saying, look if you cut down the forests you destroy 
the habitat of many thousands of sentient beings and they will suffer and 
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die. You foreclose the possibilities of aesthetic and recreational 
appreciation by humans. You risk polluting the rivers and causing 
erosion and climatic change and so on. I would use all of those 
arguments.  I wouldn't say that the forest as such has a right to remain.  
 
Denise Russell:  So it would be the instrumental value in this instance?  
 
Peter Singer: Yes, for me sentient beings have intrinsic value. Anything 
that is not a sentient being can only have instrumental value; but it may 
have very great instrumental value of course.  
 
Denise Russell:  How far do you currently think the range of sentient 
beings extends with your understanding of the empirical work and so on? 
 
Peter Singer: Well I have a grey area on that and I guess that it's 
inevitable that one will. I think that vertebrates are clearly sentient.  I 
think that crustacea are very probably sentient. I think that some 
molluscs such as the octopus is no doubt sentient but I'm doubtful 
whether simpler molluscs such as oysters are sentient. I'm not saying 
definitely that they are not, but I'm doubtful. I noticed that David de 
Grazia goes into this in his recent book Taking Animals Seriously, and he 
offers some argument that insects may not be sentient. I think that is still 
a grey area too but you would have to say it would be a source of relief if 
one could reasonably believe that insects are not sentient, particularly for 
anyone living in Australia! 
 
Denise Russell: Especially cockroaches. 
 
Peter Singer: I was thinking of especially mosquitos and ants. I can live 
without going around killing cows or pigs or birds, but to go around 
without killing ants is not easy. 
 
Denise Russell: No, unless you are a Jainist (who sweep ants from their 
path) - but even the sweeping may kill. Just finally, and maybe you don't 
want to answer this, what do you see in the contemporary times as the 
key ethical problem in relation to animals? Do you think it is the fact that 
we continue to experiment on them, or that we continue to eat them or 
put them in zoos?  
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Peter Singer: I think that the food issue is fundamental for two reasons. 
One is that simply in terms of the numbers of animals used, the amount 
of sheer misery that we inflict on animals is vastly greater in farming 
than it is in experimentation. You just have to look at the numbers. In 
experimentation worldwide you might be talking about 100 or 200 
million animals at the most, but there are five billion chickens produced 
in the United States alone every year. So the numbers are just 
enormously greater and the suffering - though you might not be able to 
see it in quite such vivid terms as when you read a description of a 
scientific experiment - can be very extreme and also very prolonged.  
 
The other reason why the food issue is fundamental is that it helps to 
form our attitudes to animals. We don't grow up experimenting on 
animals. We do grow up eating animals and I think that has a marked 
effect on the attitudes that we take to animals afterwards.  It makes us 
think of animals as objects for our use, rather than beings with lives of 
their own, and that is where all the problems start. 
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SCIENCE AND ANIMALS - OR, WHY CYRIL WON'T WIN THE 
NOVEL PRIZE 
 
Lynda Birke 
 
 
In loving memory of Tess,  a wilful and feisty cairn 
terrier,  who was killed on the road the week before I began to 
write,  and of Ginny, a loving lurcher whose sudden death shortly 
after deprived the world of beauty. 
 
 
Prologue 
 
There have always been animals in my life. I have long had a love affair 
with horses; dogs, too, feature strongly in my emotions and in my house.  
And not only companion animals,  but also the wild creatures that 
surround us all. Even in London, in the postwar devastation I witnessed 
while growing up, I learned the joy of watching the birds in the trees. 
 
In what sometimes seems another life, I trained as a scientist. 
Ambivalent though I was about doing biology (surely I could not bear 
the thought of cutting up dead animals?), I ended up studying just that. 
For years, I agonized over the fate of animals in the laboratories, and my 
own role as a student of biology in that fate. Here, I want to tell 
something of my own story - how I survived doing science, but how my 
relationships with animals finally persuaded me that science was too 
disrespectful. 
    
If now I can speak of these things, it is partly because I no longer work 
in the laboratories. Courage to speak is always easier for those on the 
outside.  But it is also partly born of my feminism,  which has 
encouraged me to ask questions that are troubling - even about the 
science that I was doing.  Silence helps no one. 
 
Becoming a scientist 
      
Becoming a scientist - like any other professional training - is a gradual 
process of learning: students must learn not only facts, but also how 
scientists behave. Much of this is gained informally, at coffee and 
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conferences. Gradually, you learn how to look at the world through 
scientists' eyes, how to ask "scientific" questions, and what counts as 
scientific knowledge and what does not. 
 
Submerged in all this learning are two critical distinctions. One is that 
knowledge only 'counts' if it is gained through scientific method; thus, 
the knowledge of people who live or work with animals does not count. 
The second is that there are (at least) two kinds of animals. Scientists, 
like anyone else, might have very personalized relationships with 
companion animals at home. Yet, in the laboratory,  the 'lab animal' 
becomes a tool of the trade, a sensitive piece of apparatus. 
 
In telling my own story now I realize that I had to live with these two 
contradictions. I acknowledged both ways of knowing, and I accepted 
two quite different ways of being with animals. Yet despite these 
overwhelming dilemmas, there were also good reasons to learn science. 
One is that I was fascinated by it, by natural history and especially by 
animals.The budding eight-year-old, pony-mad scientist learned to recite 
the Latin names of every single bone in the vertebrate skeleton - 
provided it had an equine form around it. Moreover, no one in my family 
thought that girls could not do science; on the contrary, I was given 
chemistry sets and learned to build radios. 
   
I had moreover long been drawn to natural history; surely I thought,  
science would enable me to study animals and plants in detail. Yet I was  
ambivalent about doing biology precisely because of the need to do 
things to animals. Twice over in my early training, I tried to concentrate 
on the physical sciences: but always something drew me back to biology. 
The fascination with the living world won out, even though I had to steel 
myself against the need to do dissections - or worse. I often wonder, 
when I hear people express concern about the need for people to 
understand more science, how many have been put off it for life by 
having to cut into animal flesh.  
 
Thirty years later, I can still feel vividly that sense of horror at school as 
I was confronted  with a white rabbit with pink ears, for dissection. I said 
nothing: you were simply expected to get on with it. Even by age 17, I 
had been socialized not to show emotion; I did after all, want to do 
science.  Alongside the sense of revulsion however was another emotion, 
a sense of fascination at the beauty of (once) living tissues, at how they 
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are put together. For all that I think dissection is unnecessary in 
biological education, it seems important to say that seeing 'what the 
animal was made of' did have an impact. 
   
So  while I hated the very idea of picking out the frog that was to be 
killed (which I handed to a friend to kill, rather than bear doing it 
myself), there was a profound sense of awe as we stood together gazing 
at the iridescent skin, the slowly moving red blood cells, through the 
microscope. I cannot ever justify that animal's death; but I do know that 
the awe stayed with me,  making me feel even more strongly just how 
beautiful animals are. 
 
Yet whatever one's aesthetic reaction, scientific training soon makes the 
student learn to suppress emotions. Slowly, you need to learn not to 
show questioning reactions to the use of animals, living or dead. Insofar 
as aesthetic or emotional reactions are encouraged in scientific training, 
these are likely to be responses to what nature has become after the 
processes of science. Scientists might  for instance, express pleasure or 
even excitement at the colours or the orderliness of cells in a photograph 
taken with an electron microscope, just as I felt a kind of fascinated 
pleasure at the colours and textures of the tissues from the animal I had 
to dissect. But expressing anxiety about the sufferings of living animals 
in laboratories comes suspiciously close to the rhetoric of animal rights 
and would only be discouraged. 
   
Budding scientists must learn to deny such feelings of empathy. Indeed,  
those feelings are considered 'unmanly' as the entomologist Miriam 
Rothschild once noted in a lecture. Whatever else it involves, becoming 
a scientist entails learning to acquire, or fit into, the macho culture of the 
laboratory  and forswearing such 'feminine' responses as empathy with 
the animals. In that sense, the suppression of empathy or other emotions 
in scientific training is a gendered experience. 
 
With  all these contradictions and dilemmas in the background, I began a 
research career with some unease. Somehow I ended up doing animal 
behaviour research which at least allowed me to study what animals do 
and is perhaps less disrespectful than many other areas of biology. 
Despite all my turbulent feelings about animals and nature however I had 
been sufficiently desensitized to toe the line:  ambivalence 
notwithstanding,  I did laboratory-based research - for a while. 
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Yet alongside that I was also involved in both the Women's Movement 
and in environmental activism. Out of those politics, I questioned more 
and more what science was all about:  what kinds of issues, for instance,  
influence how science is done. To begin with I continued with research 
justifying it to myself as long as nothing too nasty was done to the 
animals and they were well cared for. Much of my research was 
motivated by feminist questions - issues to do with women and health for 
example  - for which at that time I was prepared to swallow my 
conscience and use animals as 'models' for humans. Only later did I 
explicitly question the use of animals altogether, and the fact that 
keeping them in laboratories must inevitably mean their exploitation and 
subsequent deaths. 
   
It seems to me that it is an abuse of animals, not respect, (let alone the 
economic considerations) that allows large numbers of animals to be 
bred only to be wasted.  Animals are killed routinely in laboratories.  
Some are 'sacrificed' in the course of an experiment; many more are 
killed simply because no one uses them on time or because scientists 
from one laboratory in the building don't particularly talk to those in 
another. The result is that in different laboratories, animals are killed for 
different parts of their bodies, when laboratories could co-operate and 
thus save lives. I find it odd that the numbers of animals killed because 
they are not 'needed' for experiments seems to merit far less attention 
from animal rights activists than the animals killed during particular 
experimental procedures. 
 
Where individuals in the laboratory start to be respected as individuals 
by humans is where they pass over the boundaries from the world of 
'data' to becoming a pet. Researchers working with animals sometimes 
designate particular animals as pets, so removing them from the realms 
of potential experimental animals.  Naming the individual is one way of 
doing this; it is much harder to do something nasty to a Rita than to a 
numbered rat. 
  
I can well recall the occasional animal that passed through our hands that 
would become special 'like a pet' - whose death we would mourn in a 
way that we did not mourn for all of the other animals, who remained 
numbers in cages. Cyril, for example, was a white rat whose front teeth 
did not meet properly in the middle. Rather than 'cull' him (lab-speak for 
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killing), we removed him from the experimental cages and kept him as a 
pet, clipping his teeth into shape regularly so that he could eat. 
 
Still, those concerns about killing did not for a long while actually stop 
me from doing science.  I knew that animals were going to have to be 
killed. I knew that some of the procedures I might have to use were 
somewhat invasive. Yet I swallowed my feelings about those for many 
years - such is the power of the desensitization that comes through 
scientific training.  
 
Ironically, I was a vegetarian all this time. Eating animals was to me 
unethical, even unthinkable, and I did not want to be part of it. Yet there 
are many parallels between the meat industry and the breeding and 
maintenance of animals in laboratories. Large numbers are bred in order 
to be killed in both cases,  and wastage is considerable. In both 
industries, too, animals must be killed (sacrificed?) deliberately: an 
animal that ups and dies on its own cannot count either as data or as a 
meal. 
 
Meanwhile, in the lab I dissociated myself. To be a scientist in the lab 
meant having two, quite different, relationships to animals. My 
experience of those animals with whom I lived and played was so much 
at odds with my experience of animals in the laboratory. In lab work, you 
end up treating animals in groups. Animal 39/2/F is just a number in a 
cage. She represents a group or a treatment or a species, but you know 
nothing about her own history, about her life with her companions. 
 
For all that I was fascinated by science (and still am), doing it has meant 
for me a sense of alienation, sometimes as a woman in a (still) largely 
male world,  and more often as someone who cares deeply about 
animals. Cyril was lucky; his difference allowed him to become special. 
Most of the many millions of animals that pass through the world's 
laboratories each day are not.  
 
It is distressing to be in a lab around people who are being cavalier with 
animals. There is a disrespect in the way some people handle the animals 
they use - not many people, perhaps, but enough. The animals often seem 
to be tools, means to an end (and certainly become so when reduced to 
numbers in the scientific report). Perhaps people don't mean to be cruel - 
but stunning a rat by swinging it round by the tail while cracking jokes is 
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hardly a sign of respect. On the other hand, I don't know that anyone who 
wants to stun a rat would be able to behave in any other way. Is it 
possible to have respect for the animal you are about to stun and 
decapitate?  Cracking jokes may be a way of coping with doing 
something that, in other contexts, would be considered quite horrible. It 
is, if you like, a way of giving the act a different name. 
 
Naming nature: making scientific stories 
 
Science is, ostensibly, about discovering how the world works; it is 
meant to be the pursuit of truth and proof. Maybe so, but it is also - as 
many critics have pointed out - deeply imbued with the values of the 
wider society.  So its twin tasks of naming and describing nature are not 
innocent.  How animals are described in scientific texts and natural 
history programmes on television have considerable impact on how we 
collectively 
think about them.  
 
That process helps to ensure that we continue to see non-human animals 
as inferior to humans. Indeed, it is only quite recently that there has been 
much scientific interest at all in the question of 'animal minds' or animal 
consciousness. In my training,  we were strongly discouraged from the 
sin of 'anthropomorphism' - attributing human feelings to animals. What 
that means is that you can talk at home about how much Rover 
understands,  but woe betide you if you even think about what Cyril is 
feeling in the lab.  The result, inevitably, is that scientists learn double-
speak. Perhaps we might get away with jokey references to animal 
feeling or thought in the experiments: but then you must go away and 
write that arcane language of scientific articles that denies any feelings at 
all. 
 
There are perhaps unsurprisingly many attempts to refute any evidence 
that shows animals to be clever.There is too much invested, both 
scientifically and culturally, in the notion of animal irrationality and 
inability.  Culturally, we in the West have come to want to separate 
ourselves from nature,  to shore up the boundaries between clever 
humans and those furry, feathered and finned 'others' who are not human. 
  
The more easily that they become 'others' the more easily we can treat 
them with disrespect - whether they are other humans or other species.  
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That is why many scientists can accept working with rats and mice, but 
would find it difficult to work with primates: they are too like us. I am 
also reminded of an anecdote about a scientist who felt that it was easier 
for him to use greyhounds than other dogs, because they did not 'look at 
you in the same way'. I shuddered when I heard that story, and thought of 
my beautiful lurchers (relatives of greyhounds); Ginny was not 'other', 
but part of my life and I of hers. 
 
Even if scientists begin to study animal minds, there remains the problem 
of how to interpret research findings. Humans are rather too good at 
disparaging what an animal does, especially if it fails to perform a task in 
the way that we would do it, and on our terms. Many books recount the 
tale of the horse 'Clever Hans',  who allegedly could count. When it 
turned out that Hans was responding to his owner's unconscious cues, his 
abilities were discounted. But to me that is still pretty clever; I would not 
use the story to dismiss his abilities, merely because he did not seem to 
'count' the way we do. I doubt that I could spot those subliminal cues to 
which Hans responded. 
 
Those who train animals might well wonder why it has taken science so 
long to catch up with what they have long known about animal thinking. 
They might sometimes adopt the languages of science - talking 
behaviouristically of conditioning, for example - while simultaneously 
believing in the animal's abilities to form complex concepts. Admittedly,  
the kinds of animals that we train in depth are nearly always mammals or 
birds; hence, we know relatively little about the concept formation of 
other kinds of animals.  
 
There is a strong belief that animals are simply not as smart as we are. 
Yet interpreting 'stupidity' is not easy, even among ourselves. In looking 
at 'animal consciousness', Radner and Radner note the case of a species 
of bee that was fooled by experimenters into repeating a particular 
behaviour pattern over and over again1 (the bees respond to the odour of 
oleic acid, indicating to them that there is a dead bee in the hive that 
should be removed. The experimenters daubed oleic acid onto a live bee, 
and found that the bees repeatedly tried to remove it). Now, the 
behaviour can be thought of as illustrative of bee stupidity. But why are 
we so sure that they are simply being stupid? 
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We ourselves cannot always recognize death, the Radners note, even 
with the aid of high-tech medical apparatus. And we make allowances 
for humans to be credulous or gullible even when they persist in 
irrational beliefs,  while 'animals...are expected to be perfect little 
scientists. In order to earn the epithet "conscious" they must be proficient 
in logic, ever ready to change their beliefs in the face of available 
evidence, careful to take all considerations into account. When people 
fail to live up to this idea, we say they are all too human. When animals 
fail, they are said to be machine-like'. 
  
There is an issue moreover about the conditions in which the animals are 
tested by humans, as well as those in which they live. The animals used 
in such tests are usually kept in relatively impoverished conditions,  and 
given tests that may not be particularly appropriate for their species. Yet 
scientists can still conclude lesser intelligence! Even humans would 
come out pretty stupid if given tests of their ability to find their way by 
smell,  or if they had spent their life living in a space the size of a small 
bathroom. 
   
Shoring up the intellectual boundaries between us and other animals 
seems to be something of a cultural preoccupation, a protection against 
great anxiety. In a preface to a short story, Ursula Le Guin reflects on 
this,  noting that 
 
Some linguists deny the capacity of apes to talk in quite the 
same spirit in which their intellectual forbears denied the 
capacity of women to think. If these great men are 
threatened by Koko the gorilla speaking a little [sign 
language], how would they feel reading a lab report written 
by a rat?2 
 
How indeed. 
 
Living socially: humans and other animals 
   
Perhaps it does not matter that science makes these claims that animals 
are qualitatively different from us. Yet the very same science also 
expects to work on the assumption that non-human animals are 
sufficiently similar to us that we can justifiably use them as 'models' for 
us in experiments. Surely there is a contradiction here? 
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Part of the reason why scientists can live with this contradiction is 
precisely the reliance on data from groups or species (unless, ironically, 
it is intelligence itself which is studied: then individuals may well be the 
focus of attention). But when animals come in numbered lots (like rats in 
stacked cages) it is much easier to ignore their idiosyncrasies. It is also 
easier to ignore their status as sentient animals and to behave as though 
they are merely tools of the laboratory. I well remember the technicians 
in one laboratory I visited telling me that they had to swap the rats from 
clear plastic cages to opaque ones. The reason,  they said, was that the 
scientists were disturbed 'because the rats would come and look at you'. 
Looking with interest at the humans outside is something a sentient 
animal might do:  test tubes do not. 
 
By contrast to the numbered lots of rats in the lab, I knew all the animals 
at home, my horses or dogs, as individuals; I worked with them and 
knew their idiosyncrasies. I trained the horses daily and began to 
understand their individuality. Scientific accounts based on such 
individual stories would be considered insufficient for any 
generalizations about the species, horse. Yet after many years of working 
with horses, I have a strong suspicion that I know that species far, far 
better (and thus in a way that is more predictive of its behaviour) than I 
know any of the species that I worked with in the laboratory. Yet isn't 
science supposed to be about its ability to make predictions about the 
natural world? 
 
What I have learned from companions at home is how intelligent they 
are,  what love they have to give, how beautiful their movements are and 
about their different personalities. I learn too how patient they are in 
trying to get us to understand what they have to say - and how often we 
fail. Science could never teach these things. 
 
Still the laboratory work had its own value in the development of my 
own thinking about our relationship to animals and what that means. It 
was through working with rats, for example, that I came to appreciate 
better what fine animals they are. I know full well the cultural loathing of 
these animals which is played on by organisations defending animal use 
in science as they point to the fact that most experiments are done on rats 
and mice. Thus the British Research Defence Society points out to the 
public that some 85 per cent of experiments are done on these creatures - 
as though that somehow makes them more acceptable. People who have 
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not had such relatively privileged lives as I have had may of course have 
good reason to hate or fear them. Rats there are aplenty in the stables but 
I have none infesting my house, and I cannot imagine what it must be 
like to have them nibble my toes in my sleep. Cultural antipathy to rats 
certainly has some grounding in the history of disease: yet it is also 
loaded with myth,  just as stories about the 'fearsomeness' of wolves 
abound. As I watched them and worked with them  so I grew to like 
them,  those little white rats with pink eyes (like Cyril) or the black and 
white ones with sparkling dark eyes. I learned to appreciate their 
curiosity and watchfulness, their playfulness, and their obvious 
intelligence in spite of their impoverished lives in laboratory cages. 
Every day that I entered the lab, I spoke to the rats - 'Hi, everyone!'. I 
enjoyed their company. And every day my unease grew. To begin with, I 
simply changed procedures, so that the animals were interfered with as 
little as possible. But then one day I walked in and lifted the little wire-
mesh trap door of a cage as it sat on the floor. In the cage were a group 
of young sisters, black and white adolescent rats.  Curious,  they all came 
to the gap in their ceiling, putting their tiny paws onto the edge of the 
wire, their bright black eyes sparkling and their whiskers whisking. I 
looked at their paws, like miniature hands, at their glossy coats in 
different patterns, and I marvelled at their inquisitiveness. I knew then 
that I had had enough. 
 
Ironically, I think that the work I do now has more to do with science, in 
the sense that it is deeply motivated by my love of the natural world and 
of animals. I continue to think, teach and write about 'how we think 
about animals'. I did that as a working scientist, too: but now, I am 
willing to range more widely, not to restrict myself. In that venture, I am 
reminded of what philosopher Sandra Harding has said of science - that, 
despite its pretences at objectivity, it cannot be strongly objective unless 
it takes proper account of the 'missing voices'. For her, that includes all 
kinds of human 'others' marginalized from science.3  For me, that must 
also include non-humans. 
  
Living with animals has made me sensitive to the complex ways in 
which they and we become integrated into a social relationship. 
Domestic horses,  for instance, are not just 'broken', as the saying goes. 
Rather, they are usually assimilated into relationships with us (and us 
with them) from the day they are born. So too are domestic dogs. Yet 
science has almost nothing to say about the emergence of relationships 
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between humans and non-humans,  or about the ways in which particular 
kinds of animal enter human society. To be sure, we can read about the 
'instincts of the dog' derived from its wolf ancestors, and about how 
these predispose dogs to behave socially in certain ways. But where are 
the studies of how dogs become socialized into human ways?  Or even us 
into theirs? 
                        
I have often wondered what science might look like if, instead of having 
animals in numbered lots, they were treated respectfully as individuals.  
Now my work includes thinking about what science might have become,  
had its history been different, had it not relied on distancing ourselves 
from nature. What stories would scientists tell if they spent their days 
with Cyril instead of cages 34- 40? How would their tales change if they 
had watched Tess, or Ginny, instead of watching machines printing out 
data from beagles? They could no longer pretend to be distancing 
themselves from nature; rather, they would have to listen. They might 
even find that Cyril, or Ginny and Tess, had rather a lot to say, about life, 
the universe, and even humans. 
 
But can we listen? 
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SPECIESISM AND SEXISM  
 
Emma Munro 
 
 
On a global scale the most exploited humans are women and in factory 
farming the most exploited animals are female. Women are severely 
exploited through the non-recognition of unpaid subsistence activities 
and home-maker services as ‘real work’. By ‘real work’ I mean a fiscally 
responsive operation, within current Western economic systems. 
Consequently, as Marilyn Waring argues, this 'hidden economy' means 
that women are under-counted in the labour forces and their 
contributions are not  recognised in national accounts.1 
 
Similarly, female animals are over-exploited on the basis of their sex.2 
According to Gruen, the egg industry is indicative of abusively 
exploitative farming practices. Egg factory farming generates 
approximately 4.2 billion, that is 95% of all eggs in the United States 
every year. De-beaked hens are confined for 12 to 18 months in  wire 
mesh cages, without room to move around, stretch their wings, or build 
nests.2 In the United States, more than 100 million cows, sows, sheep and 
5 billion chickens, (mostly hens and chicks) are raised and slaughtered 
for food production each year.3 Mechanistic, assembly-line processes, 
designed for efficient, economical and ever increasing production 
dominate the husbandry of these animals.4 The infliction of pain and 
slaughter in the pursuit of profit and technological advancements is 
justified through constructing the experimental subject or farm animal as 
other. Being other means that animals are constructed and interpreted as 
being without desires, interests or feelings. On what basis are they 
judged as without these qualities? Gruen argues that the symbolic 
operation of the categories woman  and animal  satisfy equivalent 
predominantly utilitarian functions in Western patriarchal societies. 
Their similarities are presumed to be natural, which disguises both 
motive and investment of speakers and discourses that construct/ed the 
natural connection. Theoretical and practical correlations between 
woman  and  animal  are manifest in everyday life and in the ideology 
that justifies and preserves their submission to masculine authority.5 
 
For instance, scientific experimentation regarding reproduction has been 
justified on the basis that potential benefits outweigh emotional and 
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physical suffering. The human contraceptive pill can increase the risk of 
blood clots and heart attack.  IUDs can induce haemorrhages and bring 
about infertility. Hormonal treatment has uncalculated short and long 
term effects. Surgical intervention and manipulation with the risks of 
anaesthetisation and infection are all ‘justifiable risks’. How is it that the 
failure rate of contraceptive technologies has contributed to the infertility 
that reproductive technologies are designed to address? The basis for 
justifying these technologies provides the answer.  
 
A fundamental basis that justifies this way of thinking is derived from 
traditional Western philosophy. The systematic connections inherent in 
the dichotomisation of subject/other, polarises man/woman, 
nature/culture and human animal/non-human animal. This polarisation 
situates woman  and animal in a secondary, subordinate and 
discriminated  location - in relation to man. Dichotomisation is not 
derived from essential biological properties, it is a learned mode of 
thinking, perceiving and knowing that transforms reality into static, 
oppositional and hierarchical conceptual categories. These conceptual 
categories are confined to the manifestation of specific ideas and images 
in regard to subjectivity and identity. It is the constructed categories of 
subjectivity and identity that are the focus of racism, sexism and 
speciesism.  
 
The connection between categories of subjectivity and identity  is neither 
random nor natural. Inherent to Cartesian dualism is the disassociation of 
mind from body6 and the connection of mind with culture and man.  This 
network of connections excludes any being that is not cultured, white, 
middle (or upper) class, Western and a citizen. Women, animals, people 
of other races are all necessarily excluded. Descartes orchestrated a 
network of strategic connections that systematically excluded woman - 
regardless of whether this was his intent, it was a consequence. The 
exclusion of woman was based on her constructed and assumed 
association with nature7 and the body. My argument is that the exclusion 
of woman  is connected to other forms of exclusion. Cartesian 
epistemological paradigms provide a basis with which to justify the 
exclusionary concepts of racism, sexism and speciesism. 
 
Cartesianism is based on the polarisation of terms. It posits the 
privileged designation of positive for one term (in this context: subject, 
man and human). The privileged classification is dependent on the 
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negation or oppression and, or, suppression of its opposite term (other, 
woman and animal). This necessary relationship is one of determined 
advantage or disadvantage. This relationship is central to speciesism and 
sexism, and it is a primary reason for the indefensibility of speciesism. 
Another reason is that while the consequences of negation, oppression or 
suppression are visible the strategic connections that inform these 
processes are invisible. Debates about abortion, reproductive technology 
and  the availability of contraception for women - in both Western and 
non-Western cultures - provide an example of the binary of 
visibility/invisibility. Denial of these services and technologies is 
arguably a visible form of oppression, but the processes that inform the 
politicisation of females as a producer of progeny, food, sexual desire 
and so on are invisible. ‘Natural’ vocation, economic rationality, beauty 
and religious faith are indicative of some of the beliefs and processes 
used to justify mandates on reproductive technology. Economic 
rationalism is exemplified in the following: 'The dual aims of veal 
production are firstly, to produce a calf of the greatest weight in the 
shortest possible time and secondly, to keep its meat as light coloured as 
possible to fulfil the consumers requirement. All at a profit 
commensurate to the risk and investment involved.8  The same processes  
of economic rationality are used to justify a variety of discriminatory 
treatments from the immobilisation and over-feeding of veal calves to 
negating the value of ‘women’s work’ because it would unbalance the 
national economy. None of these terms are isolated, objective, neutral 
concepts. Each term has a complex history of associations that 
predetermine specific responses. 
 
Arguing that each term has a complex history of associations and 
consequences is best explained according to Foucauldian theory.  For 
Foucault, social formations - in combination with his classificatory 
systems of thought - are the current aftermath of former struggles.  These 
classificatory systems are rendered invisible through processes of 
naturalisation.9 In other words interpretation of the networks that link 
exceptions and qualifications to normative evaluative classificatory 
systems is required. The rendering invisible of classificatory systems of 
thought means that deconstruction of these processes of naturalisation 
can be used to reveal ‘invisible’ organising elements and principles. The 
implicit messages encoded within the concepts of speciesism  and  
sexism  can be rendered visible because systems of knowledge are 
predicated on invisible organising terms, that is, categories of 
 59 
knowledges.  Decoding is possible partly because classificatory systems 
of thought are not atemporal, ahistorical  and continual. They are subject 
to socio-political and economic struggle.  This means that the occurrence 
of changes may render obvious previously invisible organising elements 
within systems of knowledges. 
 
Foucault would argue that the intimate reciprocal associations between 
related concepts in dualisms (for example woman, animal, natural, 
manipulable ) create subordinated, habituated, docile bodies that are 
brought closer to an idealised standard. Processes of reciprocity, 
elementary to dualist concepts, instigate the automatic and perpetual 
functioning of distinctions based on concepts of ‘normality’, 
‘abnormality’, race, sex  and species.  For instance, idealised notions of 
‘femininity’ require specific repetitive practices.10 Romanticised 
versions of animal behaviour illustrate how culturally generated 
representations of subjectivity assume the validity of ‘truthfulness’ when 
they are in accord with publicly predetermined notions of ‘who we are’ 
and ‘who or what they are’.The pastoral image of a dairy cow wandering 
around a lush green pasture - featuring in butter and milk advertisements 
- is an example of a romanticised version of reality. The industrialisation 
of the dairy business means an intense five year cycle of pregnancy and 
hyperlactaction, after which the dairy cow is slaughtered. Mastitis, 
infected teats and internal cannibalisation of body tissue are common 
effects of dairy industrialisation.11 The mediatory process involved in 
feminising woman and romanticising animals indicates the gradual and 
cumulative objectification of woman  and animal.  
 
Objectification is achieved through the formation of specific knowledges 
by discourses of power. These formulated knowledges have the effect of 
dictating desired and non-desired characteristics thereby classifying a 
specific norm as preferential. The racial norm of whiteness is perhaps the 
most common and one of the most exclusive normative characteristics 
preferred by Caucasian Western cultures. Race, education, location and 
communicative abilities, to name a few qualifying characteristics, can 
automatically deny or warrant membership to the preferred norm. When 
certain characteristics are privileged and combined they reinforce each 
other in a circular process, multiplying their individual effects. These 
circular processes, which are  intersubjective and interactive, produce the 
appearance of normality, a major consequence of which is invisibility. 
The invisibility of circular processes means the processes that produce 
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norms are themselves unapparent, so it is difference that is remarked on 
and set apart.  In other words the absence of difference represents a 
privileged condition. In this way psychical characteristics are connected 
to anatomical features in a determining manner that facilitates the 
categorisation of a living being into a type, a species. Even though 
animal  and  woman may appear to be totally disparate concepts,  their 
categorisation as other is a parallel that identifies their mutual relations.  
 
Categorisation as other is processed through discourses of power.   
Inclusion within the category of other  is influenced by motive and 
investment. For example, investment and authority is evident in the 
following explicit, supposedly guiltless, admission of cruelty. They hate 
it! The pigs just hate it! And I suppose we could probably do without 
tail-docking if we gave them more room, because they don’t get so crazy 
and mean when they have more space. With enough room, they’re 
actually quite nice animals. But we can’t afford it. These buildings cost a 
lot.' A  non-speciesist discourse would not justify death from porcine 
stress syndrome because it 'in no way nullify[s] the extra return obtained 
from the higher total output'.12 
 
The relationship of the subject13 to the power/knowledge network, and 
therefore the motive and investment of the subject,  must be established. 
Though he did not suggest this, a Foucauldian genealogy of connections 
can be used to make visible the connections between the supposedly 
disparate concepts of speciesism and sexism thereby manifesting the 
active and systematic processes of participation and motivation. Both 
these processes are fundamental to producing coherent  knowledges; in 
other words, to make visible, and thereby accountable specific discourses 
and speakers who/that have the power to construct, categorise and 
determine meaning  and  to conceal their investments while doing so. 
 
It is the sexed and embodied subject (for example, the pig-farmer)  who 
experiences and practises the ideas that guarantee the connection 
between knowledge and practice.14 Open declaration of intent and 
context by the speaker of discourse may alleviate the deception inherent 
in the existing (Western) power/knowledge networks. However, it does 
not explain either how or why porcine stress syndrome can be an 
acceptable factor in the pork industry. I agree with Althusser’s assertion, 
that the way in which we understand the experience of ourselves (such as 
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our subjecthood)  is directly related to pre-determined constructions of 
social categories within specific ideological frameworks.15 
 
For Althusser, the concrete existence of ideology16 is manifested in 
systems of belief, (dead meat is necessary to human health) everyday 
practices (tail-docking, debeaking), institutions (agribusinesses, 
supermarkets) and social structures (economic rationality justifies 
abusive farming practices) which function to rationalise and justify 
widespread values (animal value is judged according to use) and 
conventions (animals don’t feel pain). These systems have the potential 
to render invisible or distort the real operations of power.17 This means 
that ideology produces, or interpellates individuals as historically and 
culturally specific subjects.18 The concepts of sexism  and speciesism 
transform the concrete existence of women and animals and reconstruct 
them as part of the social totality, partly because woman and animal, 
historically, represent a category, a social relation, not an individual. By 
which I mean the actuality of woman  and animal in real, material social, 
political and environmental discourses do not get translated into the 
social anthropocentric constructed totality. Althusser demonstrates that 
categories of thought  (sexuality, race, animality, identity and 
subjecthood) need to be historically and culturally contextualized, to 
prevent uncritical acceptance, and to render visible the investments of 
ideological and power relations.19 
 
This is evident in the way increasingly varied types of animal research 
are revealing different forms of social relations, tool making, and 
communication amongst animals. Cooperative hunting through division 
of labour and coordinative signalling by Aplomado falcons20 is one 
example of animal social relationships. Another is the manipulation by  
beaver family units of their local environment.21 Tool use can be 
demonstrated by the sea otters use of stones to hammer loose molluscs 
and abalones.22 A good example of animal communication as a two-way 
process is provided by the semantic alarm calls of vervet monkeys that 
indicate different types of danger and clearly generate specific responses 
depending on whether the predator is a leopard, eagle or python.23 
 
These diverse characteristics (social relations, tool making, and 
communication), previously the domain of the exclusively ‘cultured’ are 
not correspondingly represented in our treatment, relationship or attitude 
to animals. Similarly, women are increasingly diversifying in social and 
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political arenas, but this is also under represented in our systems of 
social knowledges. 
 
With the help of theoreticians like Foucault and Althusser, it is possible 
to argue that systems of knowledges, discourses and concepts 
interconnect. Therefore, we can expose weak links, or generate 
alternative pathways. One could produce  counter practices, counter 
strategies and counter discourses in an effort to re-direct the existing 
strategies of power and ideology at a local and conjunctural level, rather 
than simply trying to eliminate them. Both a rationalist and an empiricist 
view would reject Foucault’s genealogy as a method of producing 
knowledge because it does not  prove continuity between historical 
events, nor does it focus on origins or causal relationships and so cannot 
produce essential singular truths. 
 
Deconstructionism, however, provides the opportunity to acknowledge 
and describe without recreating conceptual oppositions. 
Deconstructionists claim that meaning and interpretation are produced 
through the artificial and constructed contrasts of dichotomous terms. 
Derridaen deconstructionism argues that analysis of the marginalised 
dichotomous concept and the characteristics of its exclusion, prove that  
the privileged concept derives its meaning and pre-eminence through the 
contrast and suppression of the marginalised concept.24 Therefore the 
privileged concept does not achieve either unmitigated identity or 
conceptual absoluteness; instead its parasitic and contaminatory nature 
becomes evident. Deconstructionism could provide a new and positive 
discourse of the body and of  the subject, which would be socially and 
historically contextual and non-dualistic in its approach. This would be 
possible because the unity, continuity and coherence of the body and the 
subject can be shown to have no natural biological pre-determined basis. 
Deconstruction argues that natural biological pre-determination is an 
effect of traditional discourses of knowledge. If speciesism is seen to be 
an effect of traditional discourses of knowledge then speciesism is a 
constructed and pre-meditated position. It follows that a constructed 
position can be broken down into its constitutive elements and its 
foundational networks of bias and profit made visible. 
 
Systematic networks of bias and profit are paralleled within the 
construction of sexism. It is not difficult to find feminist criticism25 
which is directed against  defining woman on the basis of her body. 
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Biologically determined paradigms rationalise objectification and 
utilisation of woman (as property) solely on the basis of what she can 
produce for man. This last point is equally true for female animals.26 In 
response, a  proponent of factory farming might argue that it is the 
female animals’ biological reproductive characteristics which dictate 
their predominance in ‘modern’ farming practices: 'The modern layer is, 
after all, only a very efficient converting machine, changing the raw 
material - feeding stuffs - into the finished product - the egg - less, of 
course, maintenance requirements.'27 This quote, from a farm industry 
trade journal, wherein one might expect to find the most favourable  
accounts of the farming industry, demonstrates the Cartesian 
interpretation of body as machine . The attitude expressed in this quote is 
not dissimilar to descriptions of the female uterus as  a ‘vessel’  or 
‘storage space’ passively receptive to the ‘active’ male seed. These 
similarities correlate  with the Western historical tradition which 
conceptualises the body as a machine. 'Thus I may consider the human 
body as a machine, fitted together and made up of bones, sinews, 
muscles, veins, blood and skin in such way that, even if there were no 
mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that, as things are, do 
not depend on the command of the will, nor, therefore, on the mind'.28 
Inherent to the concept of body as machine are assumptions that help 
explain the parallel treatment of female humans and female animals. The 
most common assumption about machines  is their specific functionality 
added to which is the value, use and productivity that can be gained from 
the possession of the machine. Fundamental to the concept of body as 
machine is Descartes' disassociation of mind and body.  I am not that set 
of limbs called the human body. For Descartes  the mind (or 
consciousness)  is unextended and indivisible, while the body (or matter) 
is both extended and divisible.29 When this divisibility is applied to 
animals, it supports their exploitation because fundamental to 
Cartesianism is the pre-eminent value of mind (and soul) and the 
subjugation of body to the mind. In the context of animals this translates 
as the subjugation and expendability of animals to the interests of man. 
This ‘rationalisation’ denies an inherent value of animals in themselves, 
to each other and in relation to the ecosystem. Values which, a non-
anthropocentric viewpoint might argue could outweigh the needs and 
wants of man and justify a balanced, mutually beneficial relationship 
between humans and animals. 
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Human-animal relations are widespread, diverse and longstanding as 
indicated by Native American names such as Running Deer and 
Hawkeye,30 Ancient Egyptian religious beliefs featuring human-animal 
hybrid gods, seeing-eye-dogs and patents that have been taken out on 
genetically  altered pigs with a human immune system.31 These human-
animal relationships, indicate that crossing the human-animal divide is 
considered justifiable if it is  to human advantage.  A contradiction exists 
in the sometime separation and at other times combination of human and 
animal. We separate and  hierarchise our relationships on the basis of 
difference and at the same time cite our mutual compatibility as the basis 
for combining human with animal. For example, consider the 
relationship between owner and domestic pet; farmer and commercial 
product; and animal donor organs and human health. In these cases 
human and animal subjectivity is a flexible, manipulable construct. The 
relationships between types of discrimination and prejudice are mutually 
supportive and  may be seen in the way the human-animal hierarchy is 
used to confirm racist human-human hierarchies. The stereotypical 
representation of non-caucasians as ‘blacks’ originates from falsely 
constructed stereotypes about animals. They set up ‘black’ and ‘beastly’ 
as exact synonyms, evidenced in the following book title: The Negro: A 
Beast..32 Humans distinguish ourselves from all non-human animals on 
the basis that we are superior, mentally, genetically, socially and 
spiritually. These distinctions are thought to exist, even though humans 
are genetically and behaviourally closer to primates, than primates are to 
amphibians.  Unless it is to human advantage, we disregard animal 
welfare, intelligence and wellbeing because we maintain a hierarchical 
paradigm that stipulates a superior/inferior divide. 
 
As Midgley argues, speciesism presupposes a massive, hierarchised 
distinction between humans and non-humans.33 This distinction 
determines how we define and practice morality and it determines how 
we judge the importance, utility and value of any non-human. 'Degrees 
of capacity on either side of  the human species-barrier are not allowed 
to affect this sharp divide.'34 Importance, utility and value are decided 
and classified  in terms of human benefit and advantage. Value is judged 
only in human terms. Vivisectionists argue for continual animal 
experimentation on the grounds of human to animal similarities. At the 
same time, they contrarily claim an uncrossable divide between humans 
and non-humans.  
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This divide justifies treatment of non-humans that is considered cruelly 
untenable for humans.35 The well-being and well-fare of the non-human 
is inconsequential in comparison to the privilege and preference 
accorded to humanness; 'animals used in biomedical research should not 
be considered as mere animals but rather as standardised biological 
research tools'.36 The implicit construction is that, after all, tools are for 
human use, advantage and profit. This perspective is completely 
anthropocentric: it is the elevation of humans as superior to animals 
regardless of context.  There is no context left for the needs and well-
being of animals to be considered in preference to humans. Extinction of 
an entire species is possible on these terms.  Nor is speciesism limited by 
time, geography or culture. For instance, the expanding human 
population in the Mediterranean reduced animal habitats and 
extinguished lions and leopards by 200BC in Greece and Asia Minor.  
The last pair of Auks (a flightless seabird) were killed in 1844 in Iceland. 
On Mauritius, the ground nesting dodo was extinct by 1681. The North 
American passenger pigeon thought to have numbered about 5 billion 
was hunted to extinction  between 1630 and 1914.  One animal species 
every four years became extinct between 1600-1900. By  the 1970’s 
about 1000 animal species were made extinct each year. It is estimated 
that 20 percent of the worlds animal and plant species will be extinct 
before 2000.37 This version of human superiority justifies cruel and 
abusive practices towards animals in the pursuit of knowledge and profit. 
Speciesist practices are maintained through ignorance, isolation, 
legislation and secrecy which protect agricultural industries and research 
institutions from a critical and punitive public scrutiny. 38 
 
Anthropocentric thought requires animals to conform to human standards 
of intelligence and communication, if we are to extend to them human 
rights and inherent value. I find anthropocentricity problematic on two 
counts, firstly because it does not recognise or accommodate non-human 
standards of intelligence, communication, rights and value.  Secondly it 
establishes a singular standard for human rights and human values which 
are pre-eminent, universal and absolute. These characteristics exclude 
possibilities for change, difference and alterity - amongst humans, let 
alone recognising the possibility for parallel or concurrent rights, values 
and intelligences by other species. This perspective maintains that 
animals lack the ability to think, to emote or to consider consequences, 
supporting the presumption that humans are superior. It continues, 
contrary to current research into non-human behaviour and cognition. 
 66 
Herman’s39 bottle nose dolphin experiments indicate, amongst other 
things: understanding of word order, observational learning, self-training 
and the refusal to respond to nonsense commands. Given these and other 
empirically validated examples it seems advisable to dispute the 
human/animal divide and to examine what humans regard as 
communication and understanding and the capacity to abstract. 
Regan and Singer reproduce the idea that rationality and the capacity to 
abstract are essential qualities and so they indirectly support speciesism. 
My reasons for this claim are twofold. Firstly, their dual focus on 
rationality reproduces a biased, normative,  hierarchical reason/emotion 
dichotomy. Secondly, if abstraction is the basis for speciesism then the 
consequences of speciesism are distanced to the point of virtual 
ineffectuality. The separation  and distancing of theory and practice is 
self-defeating and self-perpetuating. Considering speciesism outside of 
its practical application removes responsibility to act, or change, through 
disassociation of the self from speciesist practices. 
I have argued that the theory and practice of speciesism are 
interdependent. By which I mean the justification for abusive factory 
farming practices is derived from the belief that animals are inferior to 
humans.  It places the onus of proof on the animal or on the human to 
prove otherwise. 
Why do all non-human animals have to compete with human animals in 
a contest for equality? As Midgley argues, the idea that moral agents 
represent a chosen archetype and interact within a contractual circle of 
morality on an equal basis is self-defeating.40 The notion that all moral 
agents must be of a certain type implies circumscribed boundaries. These 
boundaries exclude or deny moral agency to any being that does not 
comply with pre-determined qualities. Rather the onus should be on 
those (human animals) who have the authority and power to extend 
respect and kindness. If a reciprocal arrangement is required, then it can 
be justified on the basis of what associated species can contribute to 
human welfare and well-being. 
I do not know, however, whether I would go so far as to suggest that this 
be our Kantian duty. Kant’s notion of duty includes the polarisation of 
duty and inclination, and the inherent valuation of intent as of greater 
significance than the consequences of the act.41 Instead I lean towards 
Hegel’s moral consequentialism which stipulates consequences must be 
taken into account.42 For Hegel, rational (social, economic, legal, 
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occupational and political) institutions form a system that is 
paradigmatic of objective ethical life. In turn, the individual is 
predisposed to behave in accordance with norms and conventions 
proposed by those rational social (etc)institutions.43 Hegel would deny 
moral rights and moral acts to animals because they lack rationality and 
freedom. However, his idea that the nature of a moral action must 
include any unintentional or unforseen consequences that develop 
condemns the maltreatment of animals by factory farmer, and researcher 
as immoral - even if they believe in the greater good or the inability of 
animals to experience pain. It follows that what is expected of each 
individual is context dependent, which means that motive and intent are 
context dependent. 
 
Benton’s position is context dependent. He rejects Regan’s distinctions 
between types of moral patients and rejects Singer’s theory because it is 
too difficult to weigh up different types of pleasure and pain. He argues 
that human animals and non-human animals are all embedded within 
ecological niches. We cannot abstract individuals from their 
embededness because it can lead to misguided actions. For Benton the 
individual is indissolubly bound up in their social and ecological 
position, relationships and conditions of life. Benton argues that focusing 
on, or isolating, specific characteristics or qualities such as a ‘rationality’ 
or ‘emotion’ results is an incomplete solution. Human-animal and non-
human-animal embededness must be considered in their own particular 
contexts and relationships. Social relations are not necessarily species 
specific consider, for example,  the ownership of a pet kitten by the 
gorilla Koko.44 This was a relationship which defies commonly accepted 
boundaries for friendship and ownership. Furthermore, the satisfaction of 
need is essential for survival and well being of individuals. Benton is 
aware of the difficulty in distinguishing between genuine and superficial 
needs however he does not give any clear criteria for deciding between a 
conflict of needs. This is problematic because needs are Benton’s basis 
for morally valid claims.45 For Benton  both human animals and non-
human animals can be in relationships and therefore can be moral 
agents.. Accordingly, a moral claim which meets the needs of humans at 
the expense of animals could be presented using Benton’s moral 
paradigm.  
 
The exclusionism and denigration inherent to racism and sexism has a 
custom-made feel to it, limiting the scope of rights and moral agency.  to 
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particular kinds of subjects. The non-included subjects are denied and 
excluded by definition, simply because they are not white men.46 
Humans comprise one species, that is, one biological classification. 
Racism and sexism, referring as they do to human-to-human interaction 
on a cultural or (biological) sex difference are defined and reproduced in 
human terms, therefore they are in a sense restricted to a human context. 
This is not to say that the consequences of racism are determined solely 
by race. As I argued previously (when discussing the dichotomous 
aspects of these terms) the concepts of racism and sexism do not operate 
alone, they materialise historical and contemporary beliefs and bias. 
Speciesism covers a broader area than the concepts of racism and 
sexism. It relates to  the immense scale of difference between humans 
and non-human animals. It is a classic example of anthropocentric 
thinking which blends  the multiple, complex, varied possibilities in the 
animal macrocosmos into a single category: animal, specifically a non-
human animal. The relative homogeneity of human habitats in 
comparison to the heterogeneity of non-human-animal habitat 
requirements should be enough to recognise that the anthropocentric 
nature of the term 'speciesism' renders it invalid and indefensible as a 
position. 
 
Unfortunately, most people would not consider it an adequate rebuttal to 
speciesism. This is because discourses of power are not disembodied 
structures that simply produce knowledge and meaning. Each concept 
must be located and contextualised because it is not an isolated 
neutrality. If we argue that each individual does not create their own 
knowledges and truth then meaning is the property and product of the 
social community. However this is not to say that knowledge is 
disconnected from speakers and discourse, instead it is to say that 
knowledge is not independent of theory and subjectivity. It follows that 
acknowledging that subjectivity is constructed is required to balance the 
alleged guaranty and intellectual appeal of knowledge.  
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BOOK REVIEWS 
 
Candland, Douglas Keith, Feral Children and Clever Animals: 
Reflections on Human Nature, xiii + 411pp. (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford,1993). 
   
Feral Children and Clever Animals  purports to be about attempts by 
humans to know about themselves by trying to understand the minds of 
other beings: feral children and animals, and at least in the first half, it 
fulfils this aim quite well. The discussion of the animal studies however 
involves very little reflection on the investigators and is mainly confined 
to a summary of the published results along with some questions about 
what they might mean. 
 
The 'feral children' who are the focus of the first half of the book are 
Peter, Victor, Kaspar Hauser, Amala and Kamala. Candland looks at the 
aims of the 18th and 19th century investigators of these children rather 
than the specifics of the children's behaviour or abilities. It is the minds 
of the investigators rather than the feral children that he sees of interest. 
This is a novel slant on these stories and it allows Candland to present 
his view of the history of psychology.  
 
According to Candland, those who studied Peter discovered in the 18th 
century, were primarily concerned with the question, 'what behaviour is 
innate and what behaviour is learned?' and the social/political 
ramifications of the answer.  I wonder whether this description is 
accurate given that the emphasis on behaviour  seems to be a feature of a 
much more recent psychology.  It is clear however that the general 
question about what in humans is innate and what is learned was an 
important one at the time. Itard's study of Victor, Candland tells us, was 
premised on a division between the senses, the intellect and the 
emotions, foreshadowing the idea of psychology as being composed of 
three functions that can be studied separately.  Kasper Hauser is included 
in Candland's reflections as a feral child but he was not strictly one. He 
was raised by humans in confinement and with minimal sustenance. The 
discussion here is inconclusive as it seems no one attempted a study of 
Kasper Hauser's abilities, the 'experts' being more concerned with the 
illegality of confinement.  
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Amala and Kamala, both reared by wolves were investigated to 
determine how or whether culture could be taught. The mother wolf was 
cruelly killed in front of them. Reverend Singh, the chief investigator 
wrote that up to three months after capture they showed a dislike for 
everything human and Amala died shortly after capture. It is curious that 
Candland makes nothing of these events. In fact the book engages only 
very fleetingly with moral issues in the conclusion. 
 
Candland introduces a discussion of four directions in contemporary 
psychology: the notion of measuring mental ability, psychoanalysis, 
behaviourism and phenomenology. Psychoanalysis is presented through 
Freud's  account of Little Hans and many key concepts are clearly 
portrayed. Candland insists on the utility rather than the veracity of 
psychoanalysis, incorrectly I think, attributing such a perspective to 
Freud. 
Supposedly leading into his discussion of behaviourism, Candland 
outlines the accounts of the abilities of the horses, Clever Hans, Zarif 
and Muhamed, suggesting that experts' descriptions had a great deal to 
do with their expectations. Interestingly Candland argues for the 
cleverness of Hans on grounds other than those provided by 
contemporary experts. Behaviourism is in fact barely mentioned.  
 
Phenomenology is introduced with a discussion of the reading abilities 
of certain dogs and the investigators' attempts to communicate via words 
with the dogs. Candland argues that the questions of those who studied 
these horses and dogs move away from those asked of the feral children 
towards an emphasis on communication.  The idea of a mental ladder 
which arranges animal species by their intelligence is then introduced 
looking at the studies of chimpanzees early this century in the United 
States and Garner's attempts to study chimpanzee communication by 
living in Africa and interacting with them in their natural state. This is 
fascinating material though received sceptically at the time by Western 
scientists as Garner's observational reports were mixed up with reports 
by Africans presumed incapable of credible testimony. Thorndike's work 
on the learning abilities of a range of animals is outlined. The criticism 
that such laboratory work is flawed because of the artificial nature of the 
test situation is elaborated. It is interesting to note however that 
Thorndike's studies of monkey's learning abilities prompted his claim in 
1901 that 'the monkey justifies his inclusion with man in a separate 
mental genus'. The experimental work of Haggerty and Hamilton with 
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monkeys early in this century is also discussed. The final hundred pages 
deals with recent attempts at communication between people and apes, 
carefully unearthing the assumptions often made here. The Kellogs' 
study of the chimpanzee Gua in their home and the Hayes' study of the 
chimpanzee Viki also living in their home revealed a great deal about 
chimpanzees' abilities but the studies failed in their attempts to teach 
human speech. The Gardners' attempts to communicate with the 
chimpanzee Washoe and the  Patterson's with the gorilla Koko, both met 
with much greater success using sign language.  Terrace's study of the 
chimpanzee Nim also revealed Nim's competence in using signs but 
Terrace was unsure of Nim's ability to create a sentence and generated 
some scepticism about ape/human communication studies in general.  
 
The second generation of chimpanzees in communication studies which 
Candland claims focused on meaning, are then outlined. The Premacks' 
studies of Sarah and other chimpanzees provide credible examples of 
meaningful communications especially related to lying and deception. 
Duane Rumbaugh and others' attempts to communicate with another 
chimpanzee also using an artificial language and the even more 
surprising results with the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin with the 
investigator Savage Rumbaugh also help overcome earlier scepticism 
and generate more sophisticated questions. The research with the bonobo 
Kanzi is only briefly mentioned which is disappointing given the extent 
and originality of his purported communication with Sue Savage 
Rumbaugh.  
 
It is good to bring all this empirical material together but it is only 
related to the psychologies in the vaguest of ways; for example, the 
accounts of animals' communications often bring in perceptions and 
phenomenology is concerned with the study of perceptions. Candland's 
conclusion is surely correct however that there is much more to find out 
about animal/ human communication and that the studies should take 
more account of how human categories of thought affect outcomes.  
 
Candland is an oblique sort of thinker making his writing unpredictable 
and interesting but also a little frustrating if you prefer writers to follow 
their aims in a straight forward manner. The book is unwieldy but it 
opens up reflection in a multiplicity of directions. Even though it is 
already a long book it would have been good to consider the story of 
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Jeanie, a modern Kasper Hauser and the investigations into 
human/dolphin communication along with the material Candland covers. 
 
                   Denise Russell 
 
       
Rollin, Bernard E., The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social 
Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals, xiv + 241pp. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995. 
 
Bernard Rollin is well known for his philosophical writings concerning 
humans' moral obligations to animals (see Animal Rights and Human 
Morality, Second edition, (N.Y: Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1992) and 
The Unheeded Cry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). The 
Unheeded Cry  is a brilliant analysis of the culture of science and how it 
works against the interests of animals. Rollin is not as opposed to the 
genetic engineering of animals as these earlier books might lead one to 
suspect. In The Frankenstein Syndrome he presents such engineering as a 
neutral tool which may be used wisely or not. A suspicion falls over this 
approach if we substitute 'humans' for 'animals' here. It seems that it is 
not possible to view the genetic engineering of humans as a mere tool. 
Yet Rollin comes close to this when he claims that there is nothing 
inherently wrong with human genetic manipulation. Perhaps this just 
highlights the need to speak about specific procedures. While Rollin's 
discussion does get down to specifics in relation to animals he apparently 
regards all procedures as mere tools even when these involve for 
instance, the creation of animal models of human disease. 
  
Rollin is concerned that our ideas about genetic engineering of animals 
not be dominated by the 'Frankenstein Myth'; that the creation of new 
life by scientific intervention must have 'hellish' consequences. He 
believes that the genetic engineering of animals has 'patent and 
incalculable social and economic benefits'. He seems to suggest that 
animals may benefit too but he does not clarify this beyond some brief 
speculations about possibly in the future breeding animals to better suit 
current farming practices, e.g.. more content battery chickens, or 
introducing genes for disease resistance.  
 
Rollin also states that genetic engineering of animals cannot now be 
stopped arguing that it is too simple and relatively inexpensive to 
accomplish, and if it were to be banned in the U.S., it would be carried 
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out in less restrictive environments elsewhere. He believes that control of 
the technology is vital because it has the capacity to 'lead to a 
proliferation of animal suffering many orders of magnitude greater than 
what we have seen before'. 
 
Rollin asks why the moral issues connected with genetic engineering 
have not been brought forward by the scientific community itself. He 
suggests that it is very difficult for those immersed in a field to gain the 
necessary distance for such reflection, that the scientific ideology 
outlined in The Unheeded Cry  still dominates, unreceptive to moral 
questions. Rollin argues that science necessarily involves values, e.g. 
epistemic ones but also 'as a social phenomenon and human practice, 
science cannot be isolated from social morality'. 
 
Rollin criticizes claims that genetic engineering is intrinsically wrong. 
While in general Rollin's arguments work well, there are two problematic 
areas. Firstly, in arguing against Rifkin's purported link between 
reductionism and genetic engineering, Rollin says that reductionism is 
metaphysically, epistemologically and even morally wrong. However he 
asserts that genetic engineering need not be connected to reductionism, a 
point with which I agree, yet it seems to be denied by Rollin in his 
Appendix describing genetic engineering. Here he says: 'The blueprint 
for both species' commonality and individuality is carried by the genes, 
which instruct and regulate the animals in how to develop, grow and 
form throughout life'. 
 
Secondly, in his discussion of environmental philosophy and genetic 
engineering, Rollin makes several fallacious moves, most notably not 
taking account of the variety of approaches which constitute 
'environmental philosophy'. His critique of Holmes Rolston's account of 
intrinsic value of natural objects is well worked out, but Val Plumwood's 
position in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature  is not so vulnerable to 
attack. Rollin's approach here reflects the long standing and unnecessary 
conflict between philosophers concerned about animals and those 
concerned about the environment.  
 
A lengthy section in the book examines the potential dangers arising 
from genetic engineering of animals for humans and ecosystems. This is 
wide-ranging and well done except that the tone in places is rather too 
jocular for the subject matter. There is a strong argument for public 
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involvement in decisions about acceptance, rejection or monitoring of 
genetic engineering of animals and some practical suggestions for 
regulatory structures. He points out the lack of current regulation in the 
commercial domain.  
 
About one third of the book is given over to ethical considerations in 
relation to animals that arise from genetic engineering and some very 
sensible discussion of how to provoke changes in attitudes. Rollin claims 
that he is moving beyond talk of kindness vs cruelty to develop an ethics 
of rights applicable to animals. However he does not answer or even 
discuss the hard questions about a rights-based philosophy. Some law 
reforms are suggested which if implemented, would provide some good 
safeguards. These reforms are not contingent upon the acceptance of a 
rights philosophy.  
 
As one of the first major works devoted to ethical questions concerning 
the use of animals in genetic engineering this book is to be praised. It is 
very informative and provides a good start to thinking about 
philosophical issues. As an attempt to explode the Frankenstein Myth 
however the book is a failure 
          Denise Russell 
 
BOOK NOTES 
 
   
Masson, Jeffrey and McCarthy, Susan,When Elephants Weep: The 
Emotional Lives of Animals , 268pp. (Jonathan Cape, London,1994).  
 
Masson, famous for his trenchant critiques of psychiatry, together with 
McCarthy, presents a fascinating series of accounts of emotions in 
animals. The main part of the book is organised around descriptions of 
fear, hope, rage, cruelty, friendship, grief, sadness, happiness, 
compassion, altruism, shame and justice. It is valuable to have this 
material collected together, some of it is well known, much of it is not. 
Detailed notes and references are included. When Animals Weep lacks 
philosophical sophistication: the core concept of emotion is inadequately 
conceptualized and there is only superficial argument concerning the 
attribution of emotions or feelings to animals. Yet it is difficult to put 
down.  
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Adams Carol J. and Donovan, Josephine, editors, Animals and Women: 
Feminist Theoretical Explorations, ix + 381pp., (Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1995. 
 
Animals and Women is a collection of 13 essays by 13 authors on the 
interlocking oppressions of sexism and speciesism. A few of the essays 
have a literary focus but otherwise the specific topics are very diverse 
applying the general theme to science, crime, hunting, pornography, 
abortion, farm animals, and politics. Lynda Birke's essay ,' Exploring the 
Boundaries: Feminism, Animals and Science', develops an important 
critical perspective towards the reluctance of much of the feminist 
literature to challenge conventional ideas about animals. The book 
contains a very useful nine page bibiography of feminist approaches to 
animal issues.  
 
Noble, William  and Davidson, Iain, Human Evolution, Language and 
Mind: A Psychological and Archaeological Inquiry, xiii + 272pp., 
Cambridge University Press,1966.  
 
Noble is a psychologist and Davidson an archaeologist and they attempt 
to unite the two disciplines to outline the process of evolutionary 
emergence of the phenomena of mind, language, and 'higher 
consciousness'. The focus is on humans and other apes and on what 
might count as evidence for language acquisition. This is a careful study 
with some interesting conclusions. The Savage-Rumbaugh research 
findings with Kanzi are discussed but thought not to be generalizable to 
wild primates or the common ancestor as Kanzi's environment (involving 
human communication) is different. Noble and Davidson argue that it is 
the human nature of the interactive context in the case of Kanzi that 
engenders the powers and capacities of mind expressed in that creature. 
The question then shifts from 'can bonobos use language?' to 'is Kanzi 
human?' A positive answer to this question would preserve the authors' 
belief that language is the key to human mentality. It would be 
interesting to juxtapose the direction of this argument with the dolphin 
studies reported for instance in L. Herman, 'Receptive Competencies in 
Language-Trained Animals' in Rosenblatt, J et al eds., Advances in the 
Study of Behavior. It is not quite so plausible to think about of dolphins 
as human. 
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